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Using two unifying models and an empirical exercise, this paper presents and extends the
main theories linking income distribution and growth, as well as the relevant empirical evidence.
The first model integrates the political economy and imperfect capital markets theories. It allows
for explicit departures from perfect democracy and embodies the tradeoff between the growth costs
and benefits of redistribution through taxes, land reform or public schooling: such policies
simultaneously depress savings incentives and ameliorate the wealth constraints which impede
investment by the poor. The second model is a growth version of the prisoner’s dilemma which
captures the essence of theories where sociopolitical conflict reduces the security of property rights,
thereby discouraging accumulation. The economy’s growth rate is shown to fall with interest
groups’ rent-seeking abilities, as well as with the gap between rich and poor. It is not income
inequality per se that matters, however, but inequality in the relative distribution of earnings and
political power. For each of the three channels of political economy, capital markets and social
conflict, the empirical evidence is surveyed and discussed in conjunction with the theoretical
analysis. Finally, the possibility of multiple steady-states leads me to raise and take up a new
empirical issue: are cross-country differences in inequality permanent, or gradually narrowing?





New York, NY 10003
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1.1 Korea and the Philippines, circa
To introduw the theme of this paper I shall
1960: Not So Similar After All
revisit the puzzle raised by Lucas (1993) at the
beginning of his article. In the early 1960’s, South Korea and the Philippines were similar with
respect to all major -nomic aggregates: GDP per capita, population, urbanization, primary
and secondary school enrollment. The Philippines had a somewhat higher share of GDP in
manufacturing, but in exports both muntries had the same proportions of primary commodities
and manufactures, Given nearly identical starting points, how can it be that over the next
quarter antury Korea experienced “miraculous” growth averaging about 6% per annum, while
the Philippines stagnated at about 2%?
If one looks beyond first moments, however, initial conditions were in fact quite different. As
shown by Table 1, the distribution of income was considerably more unequal in the Philippines:
lGini(%)ll Q1 [ Q2 I Q3 I Q4 I Q5 I Q3+Q4 I Q5/Ql I Q5/(Ql+Q2)
1965
Korea 34.34 5.80 13.54 15.53 23.32 41.81 38.85 7.21 2.16
Philippines 51.32 3.50 12.50 8.00 20.00 56.00 20.50 16.00 3.50
1988
Korea 33.64 7.39 12.29 16.27 21.81 42.24 38.08 5.72 2.15
Philippin= 45.73 5.20 9.10 13.30 19.90 52.50 33.20 10.10 3,67
Table 1: Korea and the Philippines
Sours: Deininger and Squire (1995a) data set; Qi denotes the share of the i–th quintile.
The Philippines’ Lorentz curve lay everywhere below that of Korea. ] The Gini coefficient was
seventeen percentage points higher, about 1.8 standard deviations in the world distribution of
Ginis, or 2.5 among East-Asian countries. Most strikingly, the ratio of the income share of the
top 2070 to the bottom 20Y0, or even to the bottom 40% was about tloice m la~e in the Philippines,
Similar disparities characterized land ownership: the Gini coefficient for farmland was 38.7 for
Korea and 53.4 for the Philippines in 1961 and 1960 respectively. 2 This greater concentration of
income and wealth, which persists to this day, cannot be blamed on the “kleptocratic” nature of
the Marms regime. Ferdinand Marcos was first elected president in 1965, and declared a state
1The year 1965 is the earliest one for which data for both countries are available. Moreover, these figures were
based on the same survey method (gross household income), making them comparable. The 1988 Philippine number
is for gross personal income, but very close to the 1985 figure which still [lsed household income.
‘The sourm for land Ginis is Taylor and Hudson (1972). The twelvepoint gap corrwponds to about one
standard deviation. While it is common knowledge that Korea implemented a land reform following World War
II, it may be worth mentioning that the Philippin- al= had ib own around the end of World War I, during
the American occupation period. Following the di=tablishernent of the Catholic Church, a large part of its land
holdings were purch~ed and redistributed. The relatively high land Gini for 1960 suggests that either land reform
was not as egalitarian as in Korea, where individual holdings were limited to 3 hectarm, or that land ownership
became r~ncentrated during the following forty years
1of emergency ordy in 1972. Preceding him in power at the end of the US–assisted ranstruction
period were two presidents whose main policies are described in the US State Department’s
background notis as seeking to “expand Philippine ties to its Asian neighbors, implement domestic
reform programs, and develop and diversify the economy”.
Of couw Table 1 does not mnstitute proof that greater initial equality was the reason –
cert airily not the sole reason– why the “miracle” omurred in one country and not the other.
But the facts which it documents do suggest that the answer to the puzzle may lie outside the
represent ative agent framework.
1.2 Empirical %gularit ies
South Korea and the other Eas-Asian “dragons” are usually contrasted not to the nearby Philip-
pines, but to Latin American countries. It has long been part of development economists’ con-
ventional wisdom that the very equal distribution of income and land in the first group played
a significant role in their take-off, whereas the high levels of wealth concentration in the later
were a serious impediment to growth. In recent years the literature has moved from anecdotal
to formal empirical evidence, impulsed by the findings of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ancl Persson
and Tabellini (1994) of a negative effect of inequality in cross-country growth regressions and by
Perotti’s (1992), (1994), (1996) methodical testing of the main theories.
Table 2 summarizes the main results from twent y–three recent studies of the links from in-
equality to growth or investment. I shall refer to it throughout the paper. Column (1) mrresponds
to the basic, reduced form regression, where the average growth rate of per capita GDP over some
long period (twenty years or so) is regressed on initial inequality and several controls. These
typically include: (a) initial inmme, whose coefficient is always negative and significant; (b) the
initial stock of human capital, or proxies in the form of initial school enrollment ratios; as shown
by mlumn (8) this effect is systematically positive;3 (c) regional dummies. These regressions,
run over a variety of data sets and periods with many different measures of income distribution,
deliver a mnsistent message: initial inequality is detrimental to long–run growth, The magnitude
of this effect is mnsistent across most studies: a one standard deviation decrease in inequality
raises the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by .5 to .8 percentage points. Whether this is
large or small may be in the eye of the beholder. On one hand it amounts to between 30% and
45% of the standard deviation of growth rates found in most samples. It also implies an income
gap of about 25% after 30 years, which is far from inconsequential, On the other hand, this
do= not mme close to accounting for the growth differential observed between the Philippines
and Korea, or East Asia and Latin America. However, several models in the literature predict a
non–linear effect, possibly leading to a multiplicity of equilibria. In that case small differences in
awith the ~xcePtion of the puzz]ing result that when male and female stock are distinguished, the latter aPPears
to eontribute negatively (e.g. Barro (1996), who also rliseusses possible explanations).
2initial inequality can have marginal effects well in excess of the average slope estimated by linear
regressions, and significantly influen~ long–inn outcomes.
The inclusion of mntrols (b) and especially (c) typically redums the coefficient on inequality,
Sometimes it becomes insignificant, as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1993) when the stock of human
capital is included, or in Deininger and Squire (1995b) when dummies for Latin America and
sub-Saharan Africa are added. In most other studies inequality remains si~ificant even in the
presenm of these controls, In any case, enrollments in and stocks of secondary education have a
substantial negative correlation with inequality, and in some of the theories discussed below the
link between income distribution and growth arises precisely through human capital investment.
Note finally that a large part of the cross-country variation in inequality comes from the high levels
observed in Africa and, particularly, Latin America. These persistent inter–regional differences
need to be explained, and in fact point in the direction of the models with multiple long–run
distributions mentioned above,
1.3 Overview
This paper presents and extends the main theories linking income distribution and growth, as
well the evidence on their relevance. This is done through two unifying models, a survey of
the empirical literature, and an econometric exercise. The first model integrates the political
mnomy and imperfect capital markets theories. The second one deals with social conflict and
the security of property rights. The empirical section asks whether countries are converging to the
same level of inequality. The paper focuses primarily on how the distribution of income (whether
exogenous or endogenous) can affect output growth, rather than on reverse effects from the level
of development to inequality, It thus barely touches on the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis.4
I start in Section 2 with theories where asset markets are complete and distributional effects
arise solely through the balance of power in the political system (Bertola (1993), Alesina and
Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994)). The idea is that by lowering the income of the
median voter or pivotal middle class relative to the national average, greater inequality increases
the pressure for rdstribution. This, in turn, discourages investment. The model developed
here, which combines features of Persson and Tabellini (1994) and B6nabou (1995a), displays this
mechanism but also formalizes departures from the one person, one vote, ideal. Whether or not
there is a role for productive public investment, ~owth in this class of models always increases
with the degree of pr~wealth bias in the political system. I also provide new results, together
wit h a general aveat, on the issue of whether inequality affects democracies and non–democracies
differentially, Compared to a perfect democracy, income disparities are shown to have a lesser
impact on redistribution and growth only in right–wing or wealth–biased regimes, and a greater
impact in left–wing or populist ones.
4See Fields and Jakuhson (1994) for a recent review of this issue w well as some new evicleuce, which do= not
support the Kuzneb curve hypothesis.In S~tion 3 I turn to another set of theories, where the distribution of wealth has macroeco-
nomic implications due to imperfections in asset markets, I use the very same model as before
but simply “turn off” the loan market. Indeed, the main idea in this literature which starts with
Loury (1981) is that credit constraints prevent the poor from undertaking the efficient amount of
investment. With decreasing returns their marginal product is higher, so that redistributions can
increase total output or growth. My model embodies the tradeoff between these growth benefits
of land reform, public schooling or other progressive transfers, and their traditional costs due
to depressed incentives for savings or labor supply. The other central issue in the literature is
intergenerational mobility, for which uninsurable shocks are of the essence. Some papers focus on
the decentralized equilibrium (Galor and Z.ira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), B6nabou
(1996a), Aghion and Bolton (1996), Piketty (1996)), while others combine market incompleteness
with the politics of redistribution (Perott i (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Verdier and
Ades (1993), Saint-Paul (1994), B6nabou (1995a)). In a related class of models the macroeco-
nomic effects of distribution arise from, or are magnified by, the enciogenous sorting of agents into
homogeneous immunities or other “clubs” (B6nabou (1993), (1996b), Durlauf (1996a), (1996b),
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), (1994), Maskin and Kremer (1994)). The results obtained in this
paper are representative of this entire set, and include a number of new propositions as well. I
explain for instance why maximizing growth requi i-es some (interior) degTee of democracy in con-
trast to the complete markets case. I also demonstrate how the mmbination of credit constraints
and a less than perfectly democratic political system can lead to multiple long–run equilibria,
differing both in growth rates and levels of inequality. I then use this example to explain the
common principle by which multiple steady–st ate distributions arise, through a variety of general
equilibrium feedbacks, in several of the models mentioned above,
Section 4 turns to theories based on the idea that sociopolitical conflict reduces the security
of property rights, thereby discouraging accumulation. In particular, when the gap between rich
and poor widens the latter presumably have a greater temptation to engage in rent-seeking or
predatory activities at the expense of the former. The security of property rights is the main
focus of the models of Grossman (1991), (1994), Acemoglu (1995), Tornell and Velaco (1992),
Tornell (1994), Grossman and Kim (1996) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). Only the lmt two
papers, however, explicitly link inequality and growth. I propose here a simple gTowth version
of the prisoner’s dilemma which captures the essence of this class of models. The economy’s
maximum sustainable growth rate is shown to be negatively related to interest groups’ rent–
seeking abilities, as well as to in~me disparities between them. It may then be profitable for the
rich to collectively transfer wealth to the poor through land reform, eclucat ion subsidies, or trade
protection. More generally, the analysis reveals that what really matters is not income inequality
per se, but inequality in the relative distribution of earning and political power. I also point
out that actual instability or uncertainty is not part of the story told by most models in this
CIWS, mntrary to common interpretation, As in the case of taxation, growth is reduced through
4a decline in the expected return on investment, due to a higher threat of expropriation.
Finally, the possibility of multiple long–run distributions and history~ependenm discussed
earlier leads me to raise in Section 5 an empirical question which has not been taken up previously:
are count riea converging to the same level of inequality, or are there permanent differences?
Equivalently, is there convergence not only in the first moments of their income distributions -
GDP per capita– but also in the second one (and higher), as would be predicted by most versions
of the neoclassical model once it is enriched with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks? Using a
new data set put together by Deininger and Squire (1995a) I make a fist pass at this issue of
convergence in distribution. Although it is insufficient to resolve the issue this exercise uncovers
some interesting puzzles, including some evidence of mean–reversion in Ginis.5
The general strategy adopted in this paper is one of simplification and unification. The models
are thus stripped of many elements which contribute to the richness and realism of the literature,
but are not essential to conveying the main ideas. These are briefly discussd in the concluding
section, before turning to directions for further research. All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2 Political Economy with Complete Markets
The model to be developed here and in the next section will bring together the political econ-
omy and imperfect capital markets theories. There is a mntinuurn of non–altruistic overlapping
generations families, indexed by z E [0, 1]. The utility of a member i in generation t is
(1)
where ~ and d; denote consumption when young and old respectively. This person is born endowed
with resources W;, distributed independently across agents with mean wt = E[wj]. Agents can
invest in human or physical capital according to the technolo~
(2)
where r is mnstant and O < ~ S 1; k; is the amount invested and y: is second-period pretax
income. Note that individuals face decreasing returns but the aggregate technolo~ is linear. One
can interpret w: as agent i’s basic level of skill or human capital, which can be supplemented
through investment. The higher the general level of basic skills, the easier it is to develop or
acquire new knowledge. I shall focus for a while on what happens within a given generation, in
which case time subscripts can be omitted.
5The paucity andsometim= poor quality of international data on income distribution remain binding constraints
here, as in all empirical work on the isues; see Deininger and Scluire (1995a) and Perotti (1 W) for discussions
of data quality. Another general problem is the lack of almost any data on the distribution of wealth (land is
sometimes used as an imperfect proxy), even though in mmt theories it is this distribution rather than that of
income which is determinant.
52.1 Savings and Intragenerational Growth
There is a frictionless credit market where agents in each generation borrow from and lend to each
other, at some endogenoua inter~t rate ?. The amount borrowed by i is denoted bi ~ O. Finally,
there is a government who redistributes smnd-period income. I depart here from the standard
case of linear taxes and focus instead on a simple log-linear scheme which will yield explicit
solutions with both perfect and missing capital markets. G Let post–t ax and transfer income be
~i = (Yi)l-T(i)T! (3)
where the break-ven income level ~ is defined by the balanced budget mnst raint
I J
~l(yi)l-T(j)7dz = ‘Vi di s g, (4)
o
Note that the scheme is pmgmsive (e.g., i > y) when 0<7 S 1, and regressive when 7< 0;
the maximum rate compatible with free disposal is ~ = 1. I allow ~ <0, which will be relevant
when studying imperfectly democratic regimes, but for technical reasons I restrict it to 7 >
--- Z. Given an expected redistribution rater, agent i’ maximization problem is
~ax{ln(wi + bi – ki) + pln[ (~ (ki)p~l-@)l-7(j)7 – Fbi]}, (5)
,
and the fist-order conditions are: &/ci = p“ = p~(l – ~) (ji/ki). The second one implies that
everyone invests the same amount, k* = k, hence ii = yi = rkDwl-d = y = j, and F = r~(l –
~) (w/k) ‘–P, The first Euler equation then bmmes
~ k~wl–~ _ fba — – pr~(l – ~)(w/k)l-D(w’ + bi – k).
summing up over agents and using the loan market-clearing condition J: bi dz = O yields:
k = PP(l – ~)w
1 +pp(l –7)
= 5(T)W (6)
E~h individual thus invests the same fraction s = s(~) of aggregate resources. Consequently
everyone has the same second-period income, so no actual transfers take place in equilibrium.
The critical feature of redistribution under complete markets is the tltmat of expropriation of part
of the return to investment, w opposed to actual transfers of wealth.7 In particular, the growth
G This scheme was introduced in Bdnabou (lW5a) in a context of dyn~stically altruistic families facing missing
credit and insurance markets. Applied here to complete markets, it yields the same rfiults M
from the standard scheme of linear taxes and lumpsum transfers.
70ne could easily introduce some multiplicative form of ability into the investment function
lated with wI. Optimal invatment levels would then differ across individual and equilibrium




6rate of aggregate inmme within each generation,
g(~) = ln(y/w) = lnr + ~lns(~),
declines with the tax rate ~.
(7)
2.2 Intergenerational Linkages
To extend this result to long–inn growth rates it remains to specify the dynamic linkages between
generations. The simplest kind is an aggregate spillover (as in Persson and Tabellini (1994))
through which the productivity achieved by generation tbecomes embodied into the basic human
capital endowment of generation t + 1 :
(8)
where ~~is an i.i.d. shock with mean normalized to 1, representing for instance innate ability.
Equivalently, let altruistic parents devote some of their second-period resources to children’s
education (say, primary schooling), which is provided as a public good. Specifically, let parents
care about old age consumption, now denoted d:, and about the human capital endowment of
their child:
U; = ln~ + ~lnc~ + P(1 – 7) Et[ln w~+l]. (1’)
The latter is a combination of ability and public expenditures on schooling,
Wj+l = K.Ej+l et , (8’)
with the latter financed through a proportional tax on second-period income. With logarithmic
preferenms the unanimously preferred tax rate is 1 – T, so that ~ = Tdi and et = (1 – ~) [it =
(1 – ~) y,. Nothing else in parents’ behavior or maximized utility is affected.a Thus w~+l =
K.(1 – T) c~+l yt , and normalizing the mnstant to one yielck the same result as (8), namely that
the intra– and intergenerational g-rowth rates are equal:
gt = ln(yt/yt-1) = ln(wt+]/wt) = ln(yt/wt) = lnr + olns(~t) (9)
where ~t is the tax rate chosen in generation t. Moreover, the distribution of relative incomes
w~/wt = e; is stationary, which will result in a timeinvariant equilibrium tax rate. In what
follows I shall therefore omit time subscripts once again.
‘See Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and B&nabou (1996a) for models of private, local and public education with
a similar speci6cation. The former uses overlapping generations with a “waru-glow’’bequ=t, as I do here; the
latter has dynastic preferences.
72.3 Inequality and Redistribution
I now examine the determination of taxes within each generation. Agent i ‘s optimal investment
entails a net borrowing of
b; = A(W - w’) (lo)
at the interest rate
F = Tp(l –T)p(l +pp(l –T))l-~.
Redistribution through what is es=ntially a tax on capital income lowers this equilibrium return,
thereby favoring borrowers and hurting lenders. It leaves unaffected the “representative” agent
wit h resources equal to the per capita average w, as he does not make use of the loan market.
Given optimal borrowing and investment decisions, the intertemporal utility of individual z is
equal to:
Ui(T) = V(T) +(1+ p)ln [1 + (w’/w - 1)(1 + p~(l – T))/(1 + p)] (11)
where
V(T) ~ (1 +p)lnw +ln(l –5(T)) +pln(r5(T)D) = lnc+plnd, (12)
with c and d representing aggregate consumption in the first and second periods, For an agent
with the average endowment w the second term in (11) vanishes. His preferences thus coincide
with those of a social planner mncerned only with intertempoml eficiency, in the sense of being
indifferent to the distribution of mnsumption across individuals, Since
(13)
the preferred tax rate of this representative individual or social planner is zero. g Individuals poorer
than average would like (progressive) taxes on capital: it is easily seen that for all Wi < w, ~;(~)
is single-peaked and reaches its maximum at the solution 7i to (J’i(~) = O, or:
T(l + p)
‘(T) = (1 +p(l -7))(1 +pp(l -T)) = 1- :“
(14)
This implies that agent Z’Spreferred tax rate rt is positive and declines as his relative income falls,
as in Meltzer and Richards (1981). The problem is more complicated for agents who are richer
than average, as p is not monotonic over all negative values of r, One can nonetheless show that
Ui(~) remains strictly concave on its domain [z, I], where z < – 1 W= defined earlier. Thus for
w;/w < 1 – P( Z) agent i‘s preferred tax rate is still given by the first-order condition (14); for
‘Note that V(T) is different from ex–ante efficien~ Ewi [CJi(T)]. Because agents are risk–averse, maximizing this
“behind-the veil” criterion would always call for ~ >0. By mumiug that people vote only once they know their
type I am intentionally abstracting from the insurance value of redistribution, in order to highlight its effects on
the path of output. See Loury (1981) or BAnabou (19Wa), (1995) for dynamic models incorporating this insurance
motive.
8still richer individuals it is the mrner solution, ~i = Z.
To abstract from time insistency issues, I follow Person and Tabellini (1994) in assuming
that ~ is chosen irrevocably during the first-sub-period. If the political process can be represented
by majority voting over the single issue of taxation the median voter is decisive, and his preferred
policy is implemented. Hence the central implication of this class of models: 1°
Proposition 1
Let inequality be measumd by, or correlated with, a lower ratio of median to mean pm-tax
wealth. Then mom inequality leah to mom mdistm”bution, slower growth and reduced eficiency:
r rises , causing g and V to fall.
These results on the personal distribution of wealth in a onefactor model can be extended to
the functional distribution of income, say between capital and labor. Bertola (1993) and Alesina
and Rodrik (1994) show more generally that a lower median-to-mean ratio in agents’ relative
endowments of accumulable and non-accumulable factors reduces the growth rate. The mechanism
is the same, namely increased taxation of capital, and so are the efficiency implications. The fact
that these are models with infinitely-lived agents also makes clear that the results are independent
of the assumption of myopic preferences. 11 Note finally that what is key in Proposition 1 is how
inequality aff-ts the desire for redistribution of whoever is the decisive agent in the political
system. Because the latter is likely to depart from the one person, one vote abstraction, I will
later on consider variations in political institutions.
2.4 Empirid Evidence
I now turn to the evidence on the general idea that inequality increases redistribution, which
in turn redums growth. Column (4) of Table 2 reports the results of empirical studies which
have examined the links between income inequality and a variety of measures of redistribution:
share of transfers in GDP (either as a whole or decomposed into different categories such as
welfare, unemployment, health and social securi ty), average and marginal tax rates, or education
expenditures, Column (5) then reports the effects which these policies were found to have on the
economy’s growth or investment rate, Some studies examine only one of these two relationships;
others, most notably Perotti (1992), (1996) estimate a simultaneous system.
In column (4) the measure of inequality is generally taken to be the share of the third quintile,
or the share of the third plus fourth quint iles. This reflects the emphasis placed by the models
on the median voter and middle class. The results are rather disappointing: the effect of income
10The ~aiu difference betw&n the pr=nt model and that of Per=on and Tabellini (1994), apart from the ‘act
that I allow B < 1 and make explicit the functioning of the loan market (~’s and i), k the use of a geometric rather
than linear redistribution scheme. While this modification will prove most convenient when considering mising
credit markets, it is here in~ntial. All formul~ clerived above also obtain in the traditional, linear, case.
11The quantitative ma=itu[le of the effect, on the other hand, C1O= depend on how far into the future agents
look when making savings decisions and c=ting their ballo~s; see Krusell, Quadrini and Rfos-Rtill (1996),
9distribution on transfers and taxes is rarely significant, and its sign varies from one study or even
one specification to the other. The same is true for education expenditures, Both Alesina and
Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) raise an objection to interpreting such regressions
as a test of the theory. They point out that redistribution can take many forms other than
straight transfers: progressive income taxation, minimum wage laws, trade and capital restrictions,
the imposition of government expenditure, patent legislation, regulation, and the protection of
property rights, This is certainly true but not entirely persuasive. First, the studies reported in
Table 2 already include some of these variables such as tax rates, public employment or education
expenditures. Second, it is hard to see why the increased pressure for redistribution would manifest
itself only through indirect channels and not through direct ones. Presumably the pivotal voter
or class is equalizing the marginal costs and benefits or pressure along the different dimensions
of redistribution. Finally, one would want to see at least some evidence that minimum wage
laws, trade and capital restrictions or regulation are higher in more unequal countries. Such is
not the me within the OECD: these indirect forms of redistribution are lowest in the United
States, which has the greatest pre-tax inequality, and much more extensive in continental Europe
(welfare state and labor legislation) or Japan (regulation and tracle protection).
~lumn (5) provides even more surprising news. The coefficient in growth regressions of most
of the transfers described above is positive, and frequently statistically significant. This is true
not only for education expenditures, but also for social insurance and even pensions. These results
stand in sharp mntrast to those found for pure government consumption, Most studies which
include this variable find it to be negatively related to growth, as in Barro (1990), Government
consumption, however, is conceptually different from redistribution, at least on the expenditure
side; I shall come back to this point later on. On the revenue sicie both are eventually financed
through taxes, but even tax rates fail to have the predicted growth effect, Easterly and Rebello
use twelve different average and marginal tax rates; the coefficients are always negative, but only
one is significantly different from zero. Perotti (1996) finds that both average and marginal tax
rates have a significantly positive effect on growth. One might be tempted to dismiss the whole
set of results in mlumn (5) as due to reverse causality, based on the plausible idea that the welfare
state is a luxury good –a form of “Wagner’s law”. The fact that Perotti estimates simultaneous
equation systems which allow for the level and growth rate of GDP to affect transfers and tax
rates precludes such as an easy way out. Together, the results of columns (4) and (5) indicate
that the median voter, complete markets model is missing some important factors which bear on
both the causes and mnsequences of redistribution.
2.5 Democracies and Other Regimes
Another dmension of the political economy model which has generated substantial empirical effort
concerns its differential implications across political regimes. Perhaps because some of these have
not been formally modelled but simply argued on the basis of intuition, the literature manifests
10some disagreement as to what exactly these implications are and how they can be tested. I shall
therefore explicitly formalize departures from the “one person, one vote” ideal, in a manner which
is quite specific but allows me to demonstrate some more general points.
Instead of the voter at the 50th perwntile of the wealth distribution being decisive, let it be the
agent or pressure group located at the pth percentile. The case p > 1/2 mrresponds to a system
biased against the poor due to a wealth–restricted voting franchise, unequal lobbying power,
vot~buying or simply the fact that poor and less educated individuals have lower participation
rates in elections, even in industrialized countries (e.g., Edsall (1984) or Conway (1991) for the
United States). Conversely, p < 1/2 corresponds to a populist bias reflecting either the ideology
of a non–democratic leftist regime (“dictatorship of the proletariat”) or the bargaining power
of powerful unions. To get simple expressions, assume moreover that the distribution of initial
endowments in emh generation is log–normal:
The pivotal
lnwi N N(m, A2) . (15)
voter or pressure group then corresponds to the wealth level w“ defined by @((w* –
rn)/A) = p, where @ is the c.d.f. of a standard normal. Equivalently, w* = m + AA,where
A - @-1(p). Regimes with positive values of J muld be called “elitist”, those with negative
values “popuhst”. But since even Western democracies exhibit departures from A = O, I will
use a milder terminology and simply speak of positive or negative “wealth bias” in the political
institutions. 12 Substituting In(w”/w) = AA – A2/2 into (14) yields the following results:
Proposition 2
(1) Growth h higher, the more bimed against the poor is the political system: 13g/~A >0.
(2) Inter-temporal eficiency is maximized when the indiuidud setting the tax rate is the one
with the avemge endowment w.
(3) Achieting intertemporal eficiency requires more pro-wealth bias in, a more uneqtLal count~:
W“ = W fO~ ~ = A/2.
The very stark nature of these results may lead one to think that they reflect special as-
sumptions rather than general insights, They do not. These are in fact robust features of most
political economy capital taxation models with mmplete ~set markets. This includes not only
models where there is no useful role for the government (Persson and Tabellini (1994)) but also
those where taxes or subsidies are required to correct an externality (Bertola (1993)) or to fi-
nanm some productive public investment (Alesina and Rodrik (1994)). The underlying intuitions
are indeed straightforward. With complete markets wealth heterogeneity has no efficiency conse-
quences; if preferences are homothetic it does not even affect aggregates. To equalize the social
12See Verdier and Ades (1993) for a (lynamic model of political elites, and Bdnabou (199,5a) for a discusion
of alternative representations of the political system. I show there in particular that if political influence reflects
absolute rather than relative wealth, with an elasticity A, the pivotal ageut has rauk AA and log–wealth n~ + AA*.
11marginal costs and benefits of taxation one need therefore only look at averages, which means
adopting the point of view of the individual with the ‘Representative” endowment. 13 Complete
markets also imply that aggregate consumption growth rises with the interest rate; in steady–
state, the same applies to output growth. Maximizing growth thus means maximizing the rate of
return on capital, thereby adopting the perspective of the individual with highest wealth relative
to other souras of income. This includes his valuation of any complementarities, public inputs
or regulations which might affect the private return.
The empirical literature seems to have somewhat shied away from the most direct testable
implication, namely (1), focusing instead on a more indirect, second-order effect: the differential
effects of inequality on redistribution and growth across political regimes. The claim, first made
by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and taken up by Perotti (1992), (1996) ancl others, is that the
negative impact of inequality discussed in Proposition 1 should be stronger in “democracies”
rather than “non+emocracies”. While it does relate to some valid intuitions, there are two
problems with this ar~ment.
(a) I know of no formal proof or model. Upon reflection, this is probably no accident. Such
claims concern the cmss–patiid second derivative of the growth rate, with respect to inmme
distribution and regime. Not only is it rare when cross–partials can be signed unambiguously, but
in this instance the gTowth rate (or equivalently, the tax rate) is determined by the first-rder
mndtion of the decisive agent –whether a dictator, lanclowning elite or powerful union. Its cross-
partial thus inevitably involves the third derivative of that agent or gToup’s objective function,
and therefore cannot be signed without restrictive functional assumptions. 14
(b) Whatever its sign, any differential impact of income distribution across political regimes
must surely depend on the direction in which one moves away from pure democracy. A similar
criticism was formulated by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) who pointed out that even diet ators
are subject to political pressure, whether through riots or bribes. What should matter is how
inequality affects the desire for realistribution of their constituency.
Elaborating on these remarks, I shall now formally examine the cross~ffects of political in-
stitution and inequality, A and A, on redistribution and growth. When voters or constituents
located at the pti wealth permntile are decisive, the equilibrium tax rate is given by their first–
order rendition: ln(l — p(r)) = AA — A2/2, where p was defined in (14). This implies
(16)
ls~his ~e=oni~g irnpli~itly BUmes linear ‘=ation I u in all the literature under discussion. My model yields
the same result even with progr=ive taxation because in equilibrium everyone invests the same amount (all that
matters is the threat of taxation).
14sakt_paul and Verdier (1993) and perwn and Tabellini in the working paPer version of their 1994 article
show how r=tricting the political rights of different class= affects growth (an effect similar to ~g/~A here). But
neither paper provides r=ults on how the political regime alters the impact of inequality on reclistrihution and
growth (&~/~~~A and ~2g/8~~A in my model), which is the issue of contention here.
12henw
==(l;,$;))(-1+’A-’’A((’)2+5:;~;w(-))))))) ’17)
The first term in the smnd bracket is negative, but the semnd one depends on the curvature of
ln(l – p).15 This is a complicated expression, even for A close to zero. One could of course evaluate
it numerically. Alternatively, observe that when A is small, the second term is dominated by the
first. Together with similar derivations for the growth rate, this allows me to prove an amended
version of the “democracy and inequalit y“ conjecture:
Proposition 3
As long as inequality is not too la~e, its positive effect on redistribution and negative effect
on growth am weaker, the less favomble to the poor is the political system: ~2r/8A8A <0 and
82g/8A8A >0.
~mpared to democracies, inequality shotid have mom impact on realistribution ancl growth
in left–wing, populist regimes and less impact ordy in right-wing or wealth–biased systems, 16 Note
also from (16) that in this latter case taxes first decline, then rise with inequality: 8T/~A ~ O as
A ~ ~. Distributional ~nflict initially shifts po]icy to inefficiently low levels of taxation, but the
growing skeness of the income distribution eventually tilts the balance of power back towards
the poor. The regressive nature of taxes or capital subsidies in this range (~ <0 for A < 2A)
need not be taken literally, because one could incorporate some insurance value or public good
which ensured that ~ remained positive. What is important, given the lack of any empirical
link between inequality and redistribution evident in Table 2, is the non-monotonicity of r with
respect to A. The possibility of redistribution decreasing with inequality will play a still larger
role onm combined with imperf~t capital markets in Section 3, and will therefore be discussed
in more detail at that point.
Propositions 2 and 3 make clear that what matters for growth (both directly and through the
impact of income distribution) is not the just the degree to which the political system departs from
perfect democracy, whi& corresponds to IAI, but also whose political rights or influence are being
curtailed. The empirical literature has nonetheless followed Persson and Tabellini (1994) in testing
for differential effects of absolute democracy. Typically, countries are classifieci into “democracies”
and “non-democrwies” on the basis of some index of political rights, freedom of expression and
association, etc., such as those of Gastil (1982). The growth regression is then run separately for
each subsample, or for the whole sample with a “democracy” dummy variable included –both by
lsThe ~xpr~ion ~u]tiplying (A _ A) A ~emur~ the concavity of the ol]timal tax rate with resl~ect to the
log–income of the tu=tter; it reflects the third derivative of preference, as argued earlier. Note that by using
the first-rder condition to characterize the tax rak, preferred by agents with 7t~i/~[)= e~A ‘A* ’2, I am implicitly
a.smming that it is always interior. A sim]]le sufficient condition is e~2/* <1 – ff(~).
1eThe earlier caveat about the inevitable reli an~ of a?ty rcsul t on such Cross–clerivat ives U]lOn Specific functional
and distributional assumptions naturally applia here w well.
13itself and interacted with income distribution. The results of these tests, summarized in columns
(2) and (3) of Table 2, have generally been negative. First, there is no consistent direct effect
of democracy on growth (rail that this class of models predicts ~g/8A > O). The latest study,
Barro (1996), finds a non-linear effect which I shall revisit in the next section. Turning to column
(3), most other studies have not reproduced Persson and Tabellini’s (1992), (1994) finding of a
stat istically significant differential impact of inequality ~ross democracies and non-democracies.
Moreover, the sign of the estimates varies from one study to another. But since what is really
me~ured in such regressions is the effect of IAl and IAlA rather than J and AA, I see these results
w less damaging for the theory than those of the direct tests discussed in Section 2.4. It should
be feasible in future work to provide more discriminating tests by clistinguishing between left-
and right–wing regimes, at least for some subset of countries. 17
2.6 Consumption Taxes and Labor Supply
Ohe potential explanation for the fact that redistribution does not appear to depress investment
or growth is the presenm of crdt constraints, as I will show later on. But even with complete
markets this need not happen: nothing in principle prevents progressive taxation, transfers, min-
imum wages and the like from being mmbined with a consumption tax or investment subsidy to
maintain =umulat ion at the appropriate level. Indeed, value-added and sales taxes account for
a much higher share of government revenue in “welfare state” European countries than, say, in
the US or Japan,
Going back to the model, suppose that a proportional consumption tax is introduced and its
revenue used to subsidize investment, First period consumption is now Ci = (1 – t) (wi + bi – ki),
investment (1 +a)ki and second period pretax income yi = [r((l+a)k; )p(w)l–~]l–T(~)T. Balanced
budgets require t(w – k) = ak, where letters without superscripts still denote aggregates. It is
easily verified that, for any rate of redistribution 7 :
1. Agents still save the same frsction 5(T) of their income, so that the investment rate is
5(T)(1 + a).
2. The mnsumption tax rate unanimowly preferred by agents is t“ (~) = p~~/(1 + p~r). Thus
the more progressive the income tax, the greater the recourse to consumption taxes.
3. The resulting investment rate never departs from its first best level: s(~)(l + a) = p~/(1 +
pp) = 5(0).
170ne ~- which do= not ~ufier from this problem k the historical sample of Pers.son and Tabellini (1994), wllere
political institutions are represented by the fraction of the population which clicl not have ace= to an income
based or wealth–b-d voting franchise. This corresponds closely to A ikelf, and is therefore a more appropriate
regr~sor than any post–war democracy index. The resulting estimate of ~g/~A is nonetheless negative, although
not significant. The cr=-ffect is not -timatecl in this set of regressions.
144. Introducing elastic labor supply, by replacing first-period income w’ with Wali and prefer-
en~ (1) with U = In c —61 + pin d, leaves these results unchanged. As to the growth rate,
it bmmes g(~) = lnr +~lns(0) +lnl(~), where l(~) = (1 +p~(l —~))/8 is agents’ common
labor supply.18
This simple extension of the model makes clear that it is only when redistributive policy is
restricted to capital taxation that increases in redistribution automatically translate into intertem-
poral distortions, thereby generating results like Proposition 1. A related conclusion emerges from
Bertola’s (1993) two factor model, where labor supply is fixed. He shows that when redistribution
takes the form of investment subsidies rather than f=tor taxation, wealthy agents want less of it
than poor on-, as it depresses the value of the existing capital stock. Therefore the poorer the
median voter relative to the mean, the higher the growth rate. Of course when labor supply is
elastic, redistribution depresses effort and this decline in 1(~) still lowers the growth rate. Note,
however, that the magnitude of this effect is smaller than that of 5(7-) -even with linear disutility
of labor, which puts an upper bound on distortions to labor supply.
2.7 What of Land Reform and Public Education?
Formalizing the broad idea of a link between distributive conflict and growth is an important
cQntribut ion of the pure political economy models discussed above (e.g., Bertola (1993), Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994)). The specific mechanism on which they focus,
however, appears somewhat at odds with some of the motivating issues and evidence. For instance
when interpreting their empirical results, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) refer to the idea that land
reform w= an important factor in the growth performance of Japan, Korea ancl other Asian
countria, especially when compared to Latin America. Similar claims are often made concerning
the role of public investment in primary and secondary education, which mostly benefits the poor
and lower middle class. This means that if Latin American or African countries did not grow as
f~t as Asian ones it is -among other things- because they failecl to redistribute, at least initially
19 Yet the o?lly transfers allowed in this class of (land) and perhaps also along the way (education). ~
models are those detrimental to growth. Public schooling and any kind of redistribution affecting
people’s ability to invest are just not feasible under complete asset markets. Land reform and
other reallocations of property rights which could reduce future distributional conflict are only
envisioned as off-th~equilibrium path events, in the form of on~time, unanticipated capital
levies, But if onetime rdstributions are so beneficial they should occur systematically at high
levels of inequality (Brasil and South Africa come to mind). To avoid this tim+inconsistency one
needs to explain what is impeding such transfers, and perhaps why this constraint may be relaxed
InSimilar ~mul~ obtain when labor is l= t,han infinitely elastic, but the formula for aggregate labor SUPPIYis
now more complicated because agents choose different levels of effort ii(r).
191B 1945 the adult literaq rate in Sout]l Korea w= only 2270; thirty years later, it was ‘Ver ‘070.
15following a war or major crisis. More generally, countries face a tradeoff between the benefits of
redistribution and its inwntive or reputation costs; both aspects should be explicitly incorporated
into the politioanomic game. This is the task to which I now turn.
For redistribution to potentially have any growth benefit, in addition to costs, it must of course
take place before investment is completed, But altering the timing of transfers is not sufficient:
the reader will e~ily verify that none of the earlier results change if the government redistributes
investment expenditures (or capital itself but prior to production) according to the scheme:
ii= (~i)l-~(~)~ (3’)
where ~ is defined by the budget mnstrai nt
I 1
‘ (ki)]-r(~)7 di = ‘ kidi
o 0
(4’)
and second-period income is left untaxed: ii = yi = r(ki)p(w) ]– p. This policy corresponds
for instance to a land reform (redistributing plots of size ki), but one which is anticipated by
agents, Equivalently, one can think of redistributing education budgets across rich and poor
school districts, as done implicitly in muntries which have a national system of education finance,
and explicitly in an increasing number of U. S. States in response to constitutional court mandates.
Finally, if one thinks of physical capital, redistributing investment expenditures is equivalent to
taxing large investments and subsidizing small ones: agents investing ki fue a price p(ki) =
(kl/~)’jIl-’J.20 But whatever the context may be, as long as agents are not liquidity<onstrained
such redistributions –or the threat thereof– can only distort first-best investment decisions.
3 Growth and Political Economy with Imperfect Asset Markets
3.1 Direct Effects of Inequality and Redistribution
Let me now consider the very same model as above, but with missing credit markets: agents have
no possibility y of borrowing from one another, for instance due to a severe moral hazard problem
(there is no way to enforce repayment). Later on I shall relate the model to others which make
credit frictions explicit. I naturally focus on the case where redistribution cjccurs in time to affect
the resources available for investment, namely (3’)–(4’), With no access to a loan market, agent
ZOIt might ~tim ~om natural to ~im~l~ tm first-perio[l wealth U)i. But since it is here exogenouslY deterlniu~ for
each generation this would be equivalent to an unanticipated capital levy. Formalizing redistribution as affecting
inv=tment expenditures enables me to capture its disincentive effetts while simultaneously allowing it to occur
in time to affect potential liquidity constraints. Straightforwarcl income taxation with dynfitic or infinitely-lived
agents leads to very similar expressions (BSnabou (1995a)).
16i’s optimization problem is the same as (5) before, except that 6Zis now constrained to zero:
m~~x{ln(wi – k;) + pln(r [(ka)l-T(L)’]Pwl -P)}m (5’)
The optimal investment is therefore:
(18)
where~ everyone previously invested a fract ions of aggregate income, they now invest that same
fraction of their own inmme. The government’s balanced budget condition (4’) then defines ~ to
be ~ = sti, with
(ti/w)’ = wl-’/E[(wi)]-’] .
This yields semnd-period income for agent i :
yi = ~~~(w’)d(l-’) - d’wl-~ .
Summing over all agents, the growth rate of aggregate income is given by:
)
g(~) - ln(y/w) = ln~ + ~ln5(T) – in (E[(wi)l-”])P/E[( wi)p(l-7)] ,





in Section 2.2, this is also the intergenerational growth rate: g(~~) = ln(wt+l /wt ) = ln(yt/yt_ 1).
The first two terms represent the growth rate with frictionless loan markets, derived in (9). The
l~t term is negative for ~ < 1 due to Jensen’s inequality, and vanishes for @ = 1. A more
unequal distribution of resources, in the usual sense of a mean–preserving spread in U)i, tends to
increase this loss and thereby slow down growth. A particularly simple expression obtains when
endowments are log-normally distributed, in Wi w Af(m, A2), which I will assume from now on:
9(7) = ln~ +Blns(T) –P(l –P)(1 –~)2A2/2. (22)
The intuition is straightforward. With ~ < 1 individuals face decreasing returns to investment.
Reallocating funds from rich to poor relaxes the latter’s credit constraints, allowing them to
earn a higher return. Because the government is in no better position than potential financial
intermediaries to monitor borrowers and ensure that they repay, this more efficient allocation of
investment can only be achieved together with a net transfer to the poor. This in turn depresses
savings incentives, as in the case of perfect capital markets. The same two effects are present when
evaluating intertemporal efficiency: the objective function of a planner with no distributional
mncem now equals
W(T) = lnc + plnd = V(T) – p~(l – P)(1 – T)2A2/2, (23)
17where V(7) arresponds to the complete markets case.
Proposition 4
(1) Under any given policy T, inequality reduces growth and intertemporal eficiency. This loss
decrees with the extent of pm–investment mdisttibution.
(2) Growth h hill-shaped with respect to ~distribution, and the growtlt-rnaximizing tu rate
incmasa with in~uaiity.
These results differ somewhat from those of Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman
(1993), Perotti (1993) or Aghion and Bolton (1996). In these models the effects of inequality and
redistribution on grotih depend critically on the initial distribution of wealth. This is because
investment involves a minimum project size, generating a threshold level of wealth below which
agents do not invest, or do not leave enough to their offspring for them to invest. Increasing
growth means maximizing the number of people. above this threshold, and in the early stages
of development this may require conm.ntrating resources on a lucky few or on some emerging
middle class, This non–convexity was also originally seen as a key ingredient in models with
explicit credit rationing, especially in generating multiple long–inn equilibria (poverty traps) .21
To demonstrate that multiplicity can arise solely through the feeclback from distribution to factor
prices (see Section 3.6), Piketty (1996) does away with indivisibility by simply augmenting a
standard Solow model with moral hazard, His neoclassical, concave technology again implies that
inequality is always harmful and redistribution towards the poor beneficial —abstracting of course
from incentive effects, which he does. Thus Piketty’s model, incorporating the micro-foundations
underlying the credit rationing, validates the similar result obtained by simply closing down the
loans market, as I have done here following Loury (1981), Tamura (1991) and B6nabou (1996a).
3.2 Empirid Evidence
Because asset market in~mpleteness is difficult to measure, there has been little work testing
22 Columns (7) and (8) in Table 2 show the results from Perotti its growth implications directly.
(1994), who uses the loan-t~value ratio for mortgages as an indicator of credit availability and
finds it to affect the investment rate positively and significantly, Moreover this effect is stronger
where the share of the bottom two quintiles is lower (that coefficient is significant only at the
10% level). Similarly, the negative effect of inequalit y on investment rises with credit frictions, as
predicted by the model.
21Another potential ~PPeal is its ability to generate Kuznek-type dynamics, W the range of increasing returns
initially causes some measures of inequality to increase. Eventually, ineqllality decrewses as aggregate growth pulls
everyone out of the poverty trap through a decline in the warcity of ca]]ital (Aghion and Bolton (1996)) or through
some positive spillovers from the better educated xgments of society (Galor aucl Tsicldon (1993)).
‘zThere is of aurae an empirical literature linking financial develol]ment and growth, but it does not directly
connect to the personal or functional dktributiou of income and the consequences of reclistributive policiti, which
represent our main concerns. More closely related is the literature devotecl to credit constraints on the investment
of small firms, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
18Evidence of a more indirect nature can also be considered, For instance, if liquidity mnstraints
are impeding investment by the poor or lower middle-class, any form of progressive transfer will
mntribute to relaxing them. By contr=t, government consumption will not, except perhaps
for civil servants. If anything, the taxes needed to finance it will aggravate wealth constraints.
This differential effect is remarkably consistent with the empirical evidence discussed earlier: the
cent ribution of transfers to growth is general] y positive, that of government consumption generally
negative. The effects of public education expenditures also deserve attention. Column (5) of Table
2 shows that these generally promote growth. In the absence of credit constraints, increases in
public spending on education would be offset by decreases in private spending (unless the two
are mmplements), and therefore would not mntribute to growth. To the extent that they require
higher levels of distortionary taxation they would even have a negative effect, as in Becker and
Tomes (1979) .23
The development literature also provides some valuable evidencfi, even if it does not directly
relate to aggregate growth. First, it appears to be a robust finding that credit rationing and
the lack of adequate insurance significantly constrain the investments of poor farmers away from
profit-maximizing levels and impositions. See for instance Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), or
the mmprehensive surveys by Binswanger and Deininger (1995) and Binswanger and Rosenzweig
(1995), Informal risk-sharing and mnsumption-srnoothing arrangements play an important role
but are only limited substitutea for well-functioning markets (Townsend (1995)). This literature
also provides evidence of the decreasing returns which are central to the resulting inefficiency:
whether in developing or developed countries, the family farm is usually the most efficient unit
of production. Inadequate access by peasants to credit for buying land, agricultural inputs or
equipment is one of the main causes of conuntration in land ownership; others are the favorable
tax treatment of agricultural income and various subsidies which benefit wealthy farmers most,
Diminishing returns also occur in education, according to most empirical estimates of the private
and social returns to primary, secondary and tertiary schooling (e.g., Psacharopoulos (1993)),
3.3 Politid Economy with Missing Asset Markets
ht us now examine how inequality affects the efficient and equilibrium amounts of redistribution
and the corresponding growth rates, by studying the interactions of political economy and imper-
fect asset markets. I mntinue to focus on the case where first period endowments are log-normal
23An inter=ting i~ue is the degr& to which government transfers are actual]y Progre~ive. Al=ina (1995) shows
that a significant fraction of health and especially education expenditures is often captured by the middle 40~o,
with even the top 20% appropriating a large share in some Latin American countri=. The size of transfers is thus
not as good an indicator of social equity as might appear. With respect to growth, however, th= observations
are not inconsistent with the idea that redistribution tends to relax wealth constraints on investment. First, even
Alesina’s data suggests that a significant amount of r-urces generally reach= the bottom 40%. Moreover, the key
i=ue is what segment of the population has the highest marginal return on investment; in a poor country this could
easily include parb of the middle class, = o~rvd earlier when discussing the effects of fixed costs. Naturally,
institutional reforms which could minimize transfers to the truly wellaff would always be beneficial.
19and to omit time subscripts. Using (20), individual i’s welfare is equal to:
Ui(7) = V(7) – (1 + p~(l – 7)2)A2/2 + (1 + P8(1 – ~))(lnwi – m). (24)
It can be shown that U’ is strictly concave over all ~ 2 Z, where z = – (1 + l/p~) 112< – 1 was
taken to be the most re~essive tax feasible. Except for the richest individuals who prefer this
corner solution (Ti = Z for in wi — m > (pP)–l V’(Z) + (1 – Z)A2 > 2A2), each agent’s ideal
tax rate ri is then given by the first-order condition U’i (~) = O; it decreases with own income
in w; and increases with inequality A. Agents richer than in w; = nl + A2 = in w + A2/2 favor
regressive tax= while all others, including the individual with the average endowment w, are for
progressivity. To compare these private optima to the social one, let us next rewrite:
Ui(~) = W(7) – p~2(l – T)2A2/2 + (1 + PB(l – T))(ln wi – n~). (25)
This leads to the following results.
Proposition 5
(1) A social planner wncerned only with i?tterternporal eficiency W would set a positive tax
mte rP(A), inc-ing in A.
(2) The prefemd tax mte of t}te agent with median wdth is above this eflcient level.
(3) The prejemd tax rate of the agent with avemge wealth is below the eficient level if
(1 - @)A2/4~ > (2D - 1)/(2 + p), and above in the reverse case.
The fist result is intuitive, given that redistribution now has not only efficiency costs through
5(7) but also efficiency benefits, proportional to A 2. The second one has a familiar ring, although
it should be noted that the median voter’s preferred policy now maximizes ez–a~~te or aggregate
welfare, EWi[Ui (~)]. Most striking is the third result. In the previous class of models, the agent
with average wealth always chose the efficient policy. Now there are two opposite forces which
make him “un–repre=ntative”. The first is the progmssivii?y of the tax scheme, whereby for ~ >0
all those below ti > w gain at the expense of those above. Previously, redistribution was a
threat which discouraged savings but did not materialize in equilibrium, as everyone invested the
same amount. With liquidity constraints investments reflect wealth levels, allowing the average
individual to join in “soaking” the very rich (differential product ivi ties would yield a similar
result). The opposite effect, which tends to make him choose too little redistribution, is his failure
to internalize the social losses from liquidity constraints, which are proportional to (1 – ~)A2.
As seen in (10), the missing credit market does not affect him at all because he does not want
to borrow or lend. In this sense he is the leastmpmsentative of all agents, as both richer and
especially poorer ones are affected. When (1 – ~) A2 is large enough or simply when ~ < 1/2 this
effect dominates the progressivity bias and the average agent chooses an inefficiently low tax rate,
20~sibly even less efficient than that of the median voter. 24 Democracy has its virtues, after all.
To explore in more detail the effects of political institutions and inequality on redistribution, let
the pivotal agent or group correspond once again to the pt~ percentile, with p = O(A). Substituting
in Wi = m + AA into (11) and setting U’i(7) = O leads to the following results:
Proposition 6
(1) Growth and intertempod eficiency a~ hill-shaped with respwt to the degree of wealth bias
in the political system, A. They are rntimized at Ac > Aw >0.
(2,) If the pivotal agent is at or below the median (A < O), taxes increose with inequality; such
incmes am always inefficient and reduce growth.
(3) If the pivotal agent is of higher mnk than the median (A > O), taxes are U-shaped with
Rspect to inequality. Tax cuts induced by rising inquality am always inefficient and can abo
duce growth if ~ is not too close to 1. Tax incwes induced by tising inequality have the opposite
eflmts up to some point, beyond which their contribution to intertemporal eficiency and growth
beomes negative.
The first result provides a potential explanation for Barre’s (1996) finding that growth is
maximized at some interrnediate level of democracy, and more generally for the absence of any
monotonic relationship between the two. See Table 2, column (2), with the usual caveat about
me~uring IAIrather than A. Note that asset market incompleteness and tax distortions are both
critical for this non–linear effect of the political system on the growth rate. In models such as
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or Bertola (1994) the presence of public investment or spillovers does
not change the fact that rest rict ing the political rights of the poor al~oays increases growth, as ex-
plained following Proposition 2. A polar opposite is Saint–Paul and Verdier’s (1993) model where
non–distortionary taxes are used to finanu public education, supplementing wealth<onstrained
private expenditures. As a result, growth increases monotonically y with redistribution, and there-
fore with –A, The model presented here can be seen as combining both forms, resulting in an
interior solution for the growth-maximizing political system.
As far as equilibrium taxes and we~am are concerned, results (2) and (3) also apply in the
complete markets ~se. 25 The difference is only one of degree: because the optimal level of r
now increases with A, inequality-induwd tax increases are now less inefficient and tax decreases
more inefficient. With respect to growth, however, the losses from credit constraints lead to a new
and potentially import ant explanation for its negative correlation with inequality: Proposition 6
shows that more inequality can lead to less redistribution, which in turn leads to less growth (see
also B6nabou (1995a)).
24If @ < 1/4 this is always the case for A small enough; we the l)roof of Pro]]ositiou 5.
~5This an & shown dirmtly using (14) and (13) or one can simply set 6 = 1 in (25), in which case cr~it
constraints entail no efficiency lo.si, Both the complete and missing markets cases accord with the claim in B6nabou
(1995a) that it is when redistribution is ex-ante efficient that the standard efiect 8r/8A >0 can be reversed. In
that model such a reversal can occur with progressive taxes ~ >0.
213.4 Direct and Indirect Effects of Inequality
We saw earlier that for a given policy r, inequality redu~.s growth and intertemporal efficiency.
Does this remain true when policy responds endogenously? A straightforward application of
the envelope theorem to (23) shows that such is the case when redistribution is determined
by an efficient planner, i.e. r = 7P(A) - arg max{W}. The more interesting case is when it
arises through the political process. kt r“ (A, A) denote this solution to the first-order rendition
U’i(~) = O of the pivotal group:
(p~)-lV’(r) + (1 –~)A2 – AA = O. (26)
We ean write
:=%+(~).=..x (~)
and similarly for W. The first term, which holds policy fixed, is always negative, while the l~t two
were analyzed in Proposition 6. In a pure democracy or a populist system (~ S O) taxes increases
with inequality; moreover, the equilibrium rate is always above 7P, hence in the range where W
and a fortiori g decline with redistribution. With positive wealth bias, on the other hand, taxes are
U–shaped with respect to inequality. Lower taxes have a positive effect on savings incentives but
a detrimental one on credit constraints, Whether growth rises or falls thus depends on the extent
to which agents f- decreasing returns and have unequal resources. The effects on W are similar,
except that since it puts positive weight on first-period mnsumption it does not “overvalue” low
taxes w g does. In particular, Proposition 6 established that where rising inequality letis to tax
cuts, these are never efficient.
Proposition 7
(1) If the pivotal agent is at or below the median (~ s O), inequality mduc~s both growth and
interternpod eficiency.
(2) If the pivotal agent is of higher rank than the median (A > O), inequality still lowers W m
long os ~ is not too large, For B close to 1 inequality may increase intertempord eficiency, but
thti can ody occur through an incm~~e in mdisttibution.
(3) For A >0 inequality reduces growth if A is not too small and ~ not to close to 1. In the
opposite co.se, inequality incmes growth through a decmse in tax rates.
While the direct effect of inequality on growth (through wealth constraints) often dominates,
its interaction with the indirect one (policy response) can generate a fairly mmplex relationship
between these variables. Sorting out the two channels through a structural model should nonethe-
less be possible, and even appears desirable. Particularly interesting is the third result, which
calls attention to the fact that if political power is sufficiently correlated
wealth and if capital market imperfections are not too severe, greater
22
with financial or human
inequality may actuallyincrease growth through a decline in redistribution. A similar insight will arise from the model of
social conflict dscussed in Section 4 : what matters for sociopolitical stability (which promotes
growth) is not income inequality per se, but the inequality of income relative to the inequality
of political power. Where institutions or the political technology are such that increases in the
former translate into increases in the latter, instability (or here, taxation) need not rise, and may
actually fall.
3.5 Endogenous Income Distributions and Social Mobility
Up to this point I have maintained a feature inherited from the complete markets models discussed
in Section 2: even though it plays a critical role, the pretax distribution of endowments is mm-
pletely exogenous, In Persson and Tabellini (1994) as here it simply reflects, period after period,
the fixed distribution of agents’ abilities. In Bertola (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) the
distribution of wealth is indeterminate: the constancy of factor prices combines with the absence
of idiosyncratic uncertainty to ensure that any initial distribution will reproduce itself from one
period to the next. By contrast, the endogenous evolution of the wealth distribution is at the
core of incomplete markets models. This includes those which focus on the decentralized mar-
ket outmme (Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1996),
Piketty (1996)), those which analyze potential redistributive policies (Loury (1981), Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992), B6nabou (1996a), Fernandez and Rogerson (1994)) and those which encioge-
nize redistribution as a political outmme (Perotti (1993), Saint–Paul and Verdier (1993), Verdier
and Ades (1993), Saint–Paul (1994), B6nabou (1995a)). Making these distributional dynamics
explicit is also necessary to address the issue of social mobility. The intergenerational persistence
of income and wealth disparities is at least as relevant a social concern as the level of inequality
per se. The question of how policy affects persistence, both in theory and in practice, is therefore
of mnsiderable interest.
The model developed in this paper is easily amended to deal with these issues. lJntil now
it was assumed that intergenerational linkages operated onl y at the aggregate level. Whether
through an economy-wide spillover or through universal public education, they resulted in a
transmission mechanism of the form: w~+l = c~+l y~. ht me now recognize that the transmission
of human capital operates largely within the family or at the level of small communities which
are fairly homogeneous in socioeconomic status: school districts, neighborhoods, social networks,
etc. Consider first the pure human capital spillover interpretation, under which wj+l = c:+ 1yt is
simply replaced by:
W;+l = E;+l y:. (8”)
Under perfect capital markets this changes nothing, because y~ = r (5L)P wt for all agents. Family
in~me remains i.i.d., with variance A2 = Var[ln c] = s2. With imperfect capital markets, on the
other hand, equation (20) now implies that family income follows the law of motion:
23where ~t is the tax rate chosen in period t and tit is given by (19). Income remains log-normally
distributed, and its intergenerational persistence is given by ~(1 – ~t). As a result, inequality
follows the autoregressive prouss:
(28)
The alternative mechanism of intergenerational transtission is educational investment, now pri-
vately or locally funded. With the preferences (1‘), agents all want to invest the same fraction
1 – ~ of smnd period rwources in their child’s human capital. Therefore w~+l = ~~+1~, where
the constant has again been normalized to one. In the absence of credit markets, d: = y: so (27)
and (28) remain unchanged. ~mplete markets lead to somewhat different individual dynamics,
but these retain the property that redistribution reduces the persistence of w;. From here on I
shall focus on the first case, since it has implications for aggregate gTowth whereas the second one
does not. R,ecall in particular that
Together with (28) this makes clear that once the dynamics of income distribution are endogenized,
an additional, long–run benefit of redistribution appears. A marginal rise in ~t causes the same
distortion s’(~t) as before, but now the growth 1OSS- due to the combination of wealth inequality
and borrowing constraints are reduced not only in the current period ((1 – ~t)2A~/2 is lower), but
also in dl future perioh: A~f~ is lower, for all k. This homogenizing effect means that long-run
‘G This, in turn, requires growth is maximized at a higher level of redistribution than previously.
a lower deg-ree of wealth bias A in the political system, which must therefore be closer to pure
democracy.
This brings me to the question of the long-run behavior of the economy and its income distri-
bution, which I will discuss both theoretically and empirically. As before, let taxes be determined
in each generation by the preferred policy of the pivotal group: ~t = ~“ (At, A), defined by (26).
Together, ~t and At then determine next period’s distribution, according to (28). Recall now from
Proposition 7 that when A s O, ~“ (At, A) is increasing in At, so that endogenous redistribution
acts as a stabilizing feedback on inequality,
ZGAwn~J myopic ~referenc= (I) or (I’) imply that they C1O not internalize this variance effect when setting the
current tax rate, just w they do not internalize the mean effect of yl on WL+I. With forwar[l-looking altruism or
infinite lives both are internalized to an extent which reflects the [Iiseount factor; see B&nabou (1996a),
24Proposition 8
If the median voter or some agent located at a lower pementile chooses the tax rate in eue~
per-iod (A < O), the ewnomy wnve~es to a unique steudy-state growth path (Tm, Am, gm) when
‘r 2 — 2 1 – ~2(1 – ~a)2) and tile gmwtl~ rate is —r*(A, Am), Am —s /( ~—
As one would expect, a stronger populist bias shifts this steady-state
tnbution and less inequality,
3.6 Multiple bng Run Distributions
(29)
towards greater redis-
With any positive influena of wealth on the political process, on the other hand, taxes initially
decrease with At, before increasing again. By (28) this tends to increase At+l, hence also ~~+1, and
so on. The feet-bzk from policy to intergenerational dynamics is now potentially destabilizing,
Proposition 9
If the pivotal agent i.s of higher rank than the median (~ > O) there can be multiple steady-
states. In that cue, interternporal eficiency W incre~~es m one moves from a less redistnbutive,
more inegditarian steady-state to one where Tm is higher and Am lower. This is a fortiori true
for m-ante welfare Ewi [U=], and may &o be true for the growth rate gm.
Proposition 9 and equation (27) on whi& it is based illustrate more generally the common
ptinciple through which multiple long–run distributions arise in models with imperfect capital
markets: a negative general equilibrium feedback of inequality on mobility, via a worsening of
credit constraints .27 In Banerjee and Newman (1993) this feedback operates through the real
wage, A more unequal distribution of wealth means more people who do not have the mllateral
required to bwme either self–employed entrepreneurs or employers of labor, Instead they bemme
workers, mllectively depressing the wage and therefore the bequest which they leave to their
children. Conversely, wealthy dynast ies benefit from paying lower wages. This makes for low
social mobility and persistently high inequality. Builcling on Aghion and Bolton (1996), Piketty
(1996) generates a related form of “mobility trap” through the interest rate. When wealth is
distributed very unequally there are few lenders and a lot of would-be borrowers. This implies
high interest rates, especially if the economy’s total wealth is relatively low. High interest rates,
in turn, aggravate poor agents’ borrowing constraints and make mobility more difficult; thus both
low total wealth and high dispersion persist into the next period. Across stewly–states, aggregate
income and wealth vary negatively with the interest rate. In the present model, as in Saint–Paul
“Multiple equilibria can also arise from a non-convexity at tile level of iu(lividual families, as in Galor and
Zeira (1993). With enough idiosyncratic uncertainty, however, a poor families escapes the poverty (no inv~tment)
thrmhold with positive probability; the wealth pro- is then ergo[lic and the long-run distribution uni~lue.
25(1994) and Wnabou (1995a), the feedback is through policy; taxes and transfers or public funding
of education serve M imperfect substitutes for the missing credit market. When greater inequality
leads to lower redistribution this again reduces mobility and makes disparities more persistent,
by worsening the credit constraints of poor agents, This is why transfers and growth can be
positively mrrelated across steady–states in spite of savings distortions, as stated above, A related
form of mtitiplicity omurs through segregation in models of endogenous community imposition,
In Durlauf (1996b) for instance, sufficient disparities in wealth and/or education cause well-off
families to form small homogeneous communities rather than share the fixed rests with a larger,
more heterogeneous population, ~t off from the tax base and positive local spillovers which
richer, more educated neighbors would have provided, poor families again experience no or little
upward mobility, 2s
Are countries all headed towards the same long-run distribution of income, as in Proposition
8, or are there permanently different trajectories in terms of both level and inequality, as in
Proposition 9? I shall argue in Section 5 that this issue of convergence in distribution is of even
broader interest and merits to be investigated empirically, then take the first few steps in that
direction. But first I turn to the last of the three main theories linking distribution and growth.
4 Social Conflict and Property Rights
In the median voter model (at least when taken literally), expropriation occurs through an orderly
process: votes are aunted, then everyone submits to the majority rule. At the other extreme
are models where agents or interest groups can simply grab part c)f someone else’s wealth. It is
generally praumed that this becomes more likely when the gap between rich and poor widens,
and that the resulting decline in the security of property rights discourages investment, thereby
impeding growth,
A number of related ideas have been formalized in the literature. Grossman (1991), (1994),
Acemoglu (1995), and Grossman and Kim (1996) focus on the allocation of resources between
productive, predatory and defensive activities in the context of one–shot interactions between in-
dividuals or -nomic classes. Using “dynamic commons problem” games with either Markovian
or trigger–type strategies, Tornell and Velasco (1992), Tornell (1994) and Benhabib and Rustichini
(1996) study how growth is affected by distributional wnflict between long-lasting interest groups
or coalitions. The first two papers emphasize the role and sources of interest groups’ ability to
opportunistically extract rents from others; the y do not directly deal with inequality. Benhabib
and Rustichini (1996) show how the extent to which social conflict constrains growth may depend
on the economy’s level of development, as well as on a form of inequality which relates to equilib-
2sSee also B6nabou (1993), (1996 b), Durlauf (lW6a) and Fern andez ancl Rogerson (1996), (1994) for related
sorting effects, as well as Maskin and Kremer (1994) on segregation by skills in tile labor market. In tile latter case,
when segregation occurs it is always efficient. But if one combined this ]]roduction model with credit-constrained
accumulation of human capital, multiplicity COUIC1 occur once again.
26rium selection rather than initial conditions: among the continuum of subgam~perfect equilibria
of their model, the one with fastest growth involves equal utility for all players.
I shall seek here to convey the essence of this literature and make some new points by means
of a very simple model, which relates the underlying structure of the problem to a familiar object:
the prisoner’s dilemma. The model has close links to that of Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) but
also inmrporat= ingredients from several of the others.
4.1 A Prisoner’s Dilemma with Capital Accumulation
Consider an mnomy constituted by two homogeneous groups of agents, labelled 1 and 2; allowing
for n groups would be straightforward. In period t each can choose to either moderate its claims
to the economic pie (“cooperate”) or try and extract a disproportionate amount, at the expense
of the other group (“deviate”). Formally, let kt be the economy’s capital stock at the start of the
period. The consumption of groups 1 and 2 are given by the following shares of kt :
l\2 c D
c 61(1 –5), az(l –5) al(l –5) – (~z ‘62)5’, ~z(l –5) +~z5
D al(l –5) +p15, az(l –5) – (D1 – 61)5 717 ?2
When both sides moperate, a total of ct = (1 –~ )k~is consumed, while 5k~ is reinvested according
to the linear technolog:
kt+~ = ‘r (k~ – Ct) . (30)
The parameters CYl < CY2= 1 – al capture the distribution of income in the non-conflictual
outcome, which can be thought as the market solution. They could for instance reflect the
competitive shares of capital and labor. In the singl~period game, however, (C, C) is never
a Nash equilibrium: by deviating, group i can appropriate an extra share of the pie, equal to
a fraction O < pi s 1 of the resources s kt which would otherwise have been reinvested, Of
this opportunistic gain, a fr=tion O < 6; s 1 comes from raiding the capital stock and ~i – 6i
~ O is at the direct expense of the other group’s consumption. Following most of the literature,
it is resumed that transfers or rents unilaterally extracted from the rest of society can only
be mnsumed.29 The underlying motivation is that otherwise they could be seized back by the
opposite side. That consumption is less vulnerable to expropriation than investment does not
29or alternatively, ~einvat~ in ~me -t with a lower return, such as del]osits abroad; .X Tornell and ‘ela=o
(1992). One could also introduce into the model direct or opportunity costs of engaging in expropriation, by making
non-cooperative payoffs sum to 1- than (1 — s)k~ + 6i5kt. Thus deviator i’s private gain (net of resources spent
on expropriation) fli5k~ could be strictly less than the sum of the other side’s (net) consumption loss, say piskt,
and the reduction in investment, 6i~kl. I shall not do m for simplicity, thus imposing ~i = pi + 6i. All costs and
payoffs in the stage game are of course specified exogenous]y; to endogenize them WOUIC1 re[luire morlelling agents’
resource allocation problems between pro(luctive, offensive and rlefeusive activities, as in Groxman (1991), (1994)
and Gr=man and Kim (1996). [Jsing th= pal]ers’ terminology, the ~i’s reflect the private efficacy of the predation
technolo~ and the 6i’s (more generally, the bi + pi – pi ‘s) its social or aggregate “destructiven~”.
27mean that it is entirely safe, however. The possibility of indirect taxes and subsidies, import
levies or outright theft implies that not all of the deviator’s gain need come from investment, as
is often assumed in the literature; pi and 6i are conceptually distinct, and will be seen below to
have different implications.
On net, a unilateral deviation by some group z reduces the capital stock by a factor 1 – 8;.
In a situation of open mnflict where both groups try to appropriate resources from each other
they will be lead to overconsume even more: for simplicity I assume that under (D, D) all capital
is consumed, ~1 + 72 = 1, but this is not essential for the nature of the results. The shares 7;
represent each side’s strength in the political struggle, that is, its power. They could be related
to the ~i’s and pi ‘s, as dscussed later on, but in general need not be.30 Let me assume from here
on that ~i(l – S) — (@_i — 6_i)5 < ~i for all i, which implies that the unique equilibrium of the
one-shot game is (D, D), Consider, however, agents who are infini tely–lived, with preferences
m
g=()
where I/a > 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and p rl ‘a < 1. In each period they
play the game described by the above payoffs. The capital stock kt constitutes a state variable
which makes this a dynamic game, rather than simply a repeated one. I begin by focusing on
the “first–best” case where there is only one group, or equivalently a central planner who can
carry out lump–sum transfers. Starting with k. = k, playing (C~,(~) in every period yields the




The growth mte is constant and equal to r5. This strategy
(31)
is preferable to (D, D), where the
entire capital stock is consumed immediately, if u(s) > u(O) = 1. As depicted on Figure 1 for the
case r = 3, p = .4, a = .25, the function u(.) is strictly concave and maximized at s’ ~ pll” rl/”-l.
This is the value which the planner would choose if he could select the savings rate continuously,
One could let s = 5*, but more generally I will simply require that s belong to the interval (Z, 1)
over which u(s) > 1, so that T5 is indeed the best of the two growth rates achievable in our simple
mnomy. The main question is whether it can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium
when groups have the ability to behave opportunistically and extract more than their cooperative
share from the mmmon pool of resources. 31
30For instanm, Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) impose a symmetry restriction similar to 7, = 1/2.
31were agenb alm allow~ to ~on~ulne l=S t]]au ~i (1 – 5), SUCII deviations could be shown to be unprofitable ~
long ass is not too far below the optimal savings rate 5* (specifically, aij(s) ~ 1 where f(5) -(1 –s)(5/5’)” / (1 –
s(s/s*)”) is a decreasing function with j(s”) = 1).
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Figurel: incentive wnstraints on growth
4.2 Income Inequality, Power Inequality and Growth
Playing (D, D) in every period is always an equilibrium. This high-mnflict, low–growth outcome
will naturally serve as the punishment to which players revert whenever someone has deviated
from cooperative behavior. These trigger strategies will sustain the first best if, for all i,
(Qi)l-aU(5) > (~i(l - 5) + ~i5)1-a + ~(T5 (1 - 6i)~i)’-a.
The first term on the right hand side is group i’s current consumption when it deviates and grabs
extra rmour- equal to a fr~tion ~i~ of the capital stock. The second term measures its payoff
in the following period where both groups play D, liquidating the capital stock, Rewriting this
condition leads to:
Proposition 10
If the incentiue compatibility comtraint
U(5) > (1 – 5 + (~i/0!i)5)1-a + P(T5 (1 – 6;)(~i/CYi))l-a ~ ~i(5) (32)
b satisfied jor both groups, continued cooperation and growth at the mte rs is sustail~able 0s an
equilibrium. If it is tiolated, the only equilibrium ti the non-woperatiue one with no growth.
Several interesting results can now be obtained by examining condition (32), which is illus-
trated on Figure 1.
29(1) Incentive compatibility typically holds when s is low enough, and is violated at high
enough values, This implies that there is a maitnu?n stainable growth rate which is constrained
by confict over the distribution of income, as in Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). This maximum
growth rate rs~= falls as maxi {~i/a; } or maxa{~i/ai} rise. 32
(2) Growth becomes harder to sustain when some (or both) group’s ability to expropriate the
other through unilateral, opportunistic deviations is dispmpotiio?~ate to its “normal” share of the
economic pie: for any given 5, (32) ceases to hold as ~i/ai becomes large enough. Gnsequently,
s~~ declines.
(3) Inwrne inquality also limits the emnomy’s growth rate, for a given allocation of power
and expropriating ability. For instanm if @l = ~z and ~ = 1/2, the incentive compatibility
mnstraint is binding for the group with the smaller income share, al < a2. Deviations come from
the poor, and are more likely the poorer they are. In this case it may be in the interest of the rich
to voluntarily transfer wealth to the poor through land reform, education subsidies, a minimum
wage, or trade protection: group 2 is better off if its own share a2 can be permanently reduced
to increase al. This scenario, formalized by Grossman (1994), (1995) in a static context, arises
here from the desirability of growth.
(4) However, it could be the poor who are relatively more vulnerable to expropriation or
exploitation; one can think of small peasants versus large. landowners. If PI/al = ~2/a2 but
~1/al < T2/a2, for instance, it is the rich’s threat to deviate which reduces accumulation, The
model thus makes clear that what matters is not inequality in the (equilibrium) distribution
of income per se, as often claimed in the literature, but inequality in the relative distribution of
earning and political power: sin~ al + a2 = ~1 + 72 = 1, the minimal value of maxi {~i/ai}, which
maximizes growth, is 1.33 Note also that the important role played by off-the equilibrium–path
payoffs is a potential problem for the empirical implementation of such gametheoretic models. I
shall return to it below.
(5) The more of the expropriation comes from capital, as opposed to other people’s consump-
tion, the easier it is to sustain cooperation: vi is decreasing in d;.
32For instance as s tends to zero, u(5) = 1 + p(r5)1 ‘“ > 1 + p(rs(l – 6~)(~i/~~))’ ‘a x vi(s) as long as (1 –
6i)(~i/~) < 1. Conversely, u(1) = O < vi(l) always and u@) = 1 < ~i(i) whenever fli/~i > 1. In the game
described here there are only two sustainable growth rates, rs and zero. But suppose now that there is in fact a
continuum of such games, indexed by s, which can be played; all other parameters are invariant. Among values
of 6 for which cooperation can be sustained, both groups will prefer the one with the constrained-optimal growth
rate, 5“’ S min{s” ,5ma. }. They will also be unanimous in preferring the s’” game to any other with a single,
uncooperative equilibrium if u(s’”) > m~i{(~;/~i) 1‘“}. If this condition is not satisfied the Pareto frontier includes
both the s’* and the zero-growth outcomes.
33Deviations by the rich also occur in Barbosa, Jovanovic and Spiegel (1996), but the context is different. Agents
with stochastic endowments enter into an ex–ante efficient income sharing agreement. Ex–post, they may renege
and fight over the appropriation of total r-urces. Their decisions are based on current payoffs only.
304.3 Empirical Evidence
The findings from most studies which have examined the links between inequality, mnflict over
property rights, and growth are summarized in columns (9) and (10) of Table 2. Two broad
m-ures of “instability” or “insecurity” have been considered. The first consists of indices of
sociopolitiml instability constructed from various mmbinations of protests, strikes, government
turnover, political violence, mups, revolutions, and the like (e.g., Venieris and Gupta (1986),
Londregan and Poole (1990), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina, Olzer and Roubini (1996),
Perotti (1996)). Because of the potential] y serious simultaneity problem most studies estimate a
joint model of growth and instability. The other form of “instability” is more directly linked to the
issue of property rights. It is measured by various indicators of “country risk” sold by specialized
fires to international investors, such as sovereign default risk, expropriation or nationalization
risk, rule of law, enforceability of contracts, quality of the bureaucracy, corruption, and so on; see
Keefer and Knack (1995), Svensson (1993) or Barro (1996). Column (9) shows that both types
of security deteriorate as a result of increased income inequality. In turn, column (10) shows
that both greater political turmoil and lower protection of property rights decrease investment
and growth, The general idea that inequality exacerbates social conflict, which in turn makes
property rights less secure and reduces growth thus appears well supported by the evidenm;
indeed it is eminently plausible. The specific channels through which this occurs, however, remain
to be clearly identified, Svensson (1993) finds that when both political instability and property
rights variables are included in investment regressions, only the latter are significant; on the other
hand, greater political stability implies more secure property rights, as does a more equal income
distribution. Keefer and Knack (1995) report that when one controls for initial GDP in the
investment equation, political instability becomes insignificant.
I also wrote support for “the general idea” rather than “the models” because the link between
the latter and intuitive or empirical notions of social or political instability is still somewhat ten-
uous. This can be seen from the representative model presented above. First, note that contrary
to mmmon interpretation, unurt aint y or unpredictability is really not pati of the story. The
mechanism formalized here and in most of the literature is not one where greater inequality leads,
through more acute political conflict, to a mean–preserving spread in the return to investment
(and even this is known to have an ambiguous effect). It has no up-side and thus leads, ve~ muclt
m in the voting modeZs, to a lower mean return due increased expropriation, or the threat thereof.
Second, with perfect information about actions ancl payoffs, equilibrium is achieved without any
“friction” or resource dissipation, Just as there is no reason for delay to occllr in a bargaining
model with symmetric information, there is no role in these models for strikes, riots, coups, as-
sassinations, etc. Incorporating incomplete information, as for instance in Alesina and Drazen
(1991), will generate delays and resource-dissipating struggles along the equilibrium path; but the
extent to which these occur will reflect not so much the distribution of income (and power) as
the extent of agents’ uncertainty over what this distribution is. Why the two should be related
31is not obvious, Given imperfect information, resources would be dissipated as well in standard
politiml economy models: the voter who turns out to be pivotal (say, median) will eventually
have his way, but only after costly political campaigns, lobbying and legislative maneuvers. This
will make the two types of model a little more similar yet, as would the incorporation of strategic,
dynamic mncerns into the voting model: reputation of the pivotal class for fiscal restraint, trigger
strategies on the part of the private sector, and so on.
5 Convergence: On to Second Moments (and Higher)
Are muntries mnverging to the same level of inequality? This question may seem unusual, and
indeed it has not been taken up by the empirical literature. Yet it is important, on several counts,
First, ascertaining the facts is in itself of interest. It is common knowledge that Latin American
muntries tend to be more unequal than European ones, themselves less equal than East–Asian
on-. Similarly, the specter of U, S.–style inequality is often used in Europe to justify high levels
of redistribution and minimum wages. But are all these gaps really permanent, or inexorably
narrowing?34
%nd, it can shed light on the relevance of models with multiple steady–states and history–
dependence of the inmme distribution, In particular, it provicles an indirect test of the joint
mechanisms of credit market inmmpleteness and negative feedback from inequality to social mo-
bility which underlie these theories, as explained in Section 3.6.
Third, there is now a vast empirical literature examining international convergence in per
capita incomes. This variable is after all only the first mo?nent of each collntry’s income distribu-
tion. Once augmented with idiosyncratic shocks, most versions of the neoclassical growth model
imply conve~ence i~l distn”bution: countries with the same fundamentals should tend towards
the same invariant distribution of wealth and pretax income. 35 Barring unexplained differences
in “tmtes” for equity or in the distribution of innate abilities, persistent differences in the de-
gree of inequality would mnversely indicate the presence of some form of increasing return or
mmplementarity in the mnornic or politioeconomic structure.
34~k~g at OECD ~oun~ri= in the l~gO’S, Gottscllalk and Smeeding (1995) find no relation between initial
levels of inequality and chang= in inequality during the 80’s. If anything, there is some evidence of polarization at
the extremm, of the type suggested by Proposition 9. The largest incre~s occurred in the UI{ and the [JS, which
had the highest initial levels, su~-ting that these countri= may be converging to a high inequality steadyatate.
The small~t incre= occurred in Italy, France, Portugal and Denmark; thus Denmark could be converging to a
low inequality steady=tate. While this exercise provides valuable information, it suffers from being based on a
small number of eountri~, several of which are observed over a very short interval of time.
qssee for instanm Banerjee and Newman (1991), Ayagari (1994), Bertola (1995) or the c= without credit–
constraints in Piketty (1996) for examples of this ergodicity property. Some of these models even include credit
rationing (agents can borrow less than what they muld repay with probability one) but the feedback from the
wealth distribution to credit constraints discussed in Section 3.6 is either absent because the latter are specified
exogenously, or as the economy grows it becomes too weak to generate multiplicity (Aghion and Bolton (19M)).
Departing from homothetic preferences by introducing a minimum consumption level w in Cbatterjee (1994) could
probably lead to history dependence, but the stochastic version of that model still remains to be studied.
32Having raised the question of mnvergence in higher moments, I shall make here a first pass
at trying to answer it. Ideally, one would apply to an international panel of inequality measures
the same tests which are now standard in the literature on the mnvergence of first moments:
regressing rates of change on initial values, examining whether cross–sectional dispersion falls
over time (Barro (1991), Barro and Sala–i-Martin (1992)), or the more complex tests of Quah
(1993) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995). The binding constraint, however, is data: no such panel
exists over a long enough period. The closest substitute is a new data base recently put together
by Deininger and Squire (1995a). It significantly expands the coverage of previous data sets, both
over time and over countries, to the extent that one can think of it as a panel with (still many)
missing wlls. I shall also use data for a sample of OECD countries from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS). It mntains far fewer observations but considerable effort has been devoted to making
the numbers comparable across countries.
I start with a bird’s eye view of the issue, by comparing the seven main regions of the world
for which Deininger and Squire (1995a) provide summary statistics on inequality: Latin America,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia/Pacific, South Asia, OECD and
High Income, and Eastern Europe. For each region they constructed decaclal averages of various
inequality measures, by averaging all available observations from the 1960’s to the 1990’s. From
these numbers I computed both the world average and the cross-regional standard deviation of
each inequality measure, These are report ed in Table 3.
I Gini (%) I Aclj. Gini (%) I Bottom 20% I 3d+4’h Quiutilfi Top 20% Top 20 / Bottom20
Mean
1960!s 39.99 41.52 6.18 35.65 47.84 9.03
1970’s 39.34 40.92 6.03 36.49 47.24 8.89
1980’s 37.47 39.92 6.52 37.56 44.73 8.31
1990’s 38.28 41.63 6.43 37.24 45.47 8.46
Standard Deviation
1960’s 10.03 10.77 2.17 4.29 8.91 4.52
1970’s 10.54 11.23 2.77 3.74 8.76 4.29
1980’s 8.33 9.43 1.50 2.97 5.97 3.73
1990’s 7.79 9.46 1.58 3,52 6.66 3.82
Table 3: inequality acrm seven main regions
Regions: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa , East Asia / Pacific,
South Asia, OECD and High Income, Eastern Europe.
Source: computed from Deininger and Squire (1995a), Tables 5 to 7.
While these are somewhat crude statistics, they point to some interesting facts.36 For the
mean level of inequality in the world the picture is one of relative stability; some small and
36One would want to weigh regions by population or income, for instance. The “adjusted Gini” in the second
column of Table 3 refers to an adjustment made by Deiuinger and Squire (1995a) to observations bawd on expendi-
ture rather than income surveys. The former typically bias the Gini coefficient downward. The adjustment consists
33gradual improvement is visible until the 1980’s, after which the situation starts to deteriorate.
Cross-regional variations in inequality, on the other hand, show a clear decline. The coefficient
of variation falls by 1970 for the Gini mefficients, 30% for the shares of the bottom quintile, 22%
for the shares of the third and fourth quintiles and 37% for the share the top quintile. Note also
that almost all of this “convergent” occurred between the 1970’s and 1980’s.37
I next went to the full sample and ran simple convergence tests for the Gini coefficients across
individual countries, to the extent permitted by the data. I chose the Gini rather than particular
shar= or share ratios because it was available for more observations, and because it relates more
directly to the transition equation (28) in the formal model, 3s In the first test I computed for
ewh muntry the average yearly rate of change in the Gini coefficient between the first and last
available observations. I then ran a regression of this variable on a constant and the initial value
of the Gini. The results are reported in Table 4, for four samples.
I Sample 1 (N=69) II Sample 2 (N=25) I Sample 3 (N=19)
c .641 .755 1.22
(3.07) (2.65) (4.49)
initial Gini -.015 -.017 -.036
(-3.04) (-2.54) (-4.75)







Table 4: convergence tesh using using Ginis’ average rate of change
(heteroskedasticity-consistent t=tatistics in parenthesis)
Sample 1: Deininger and Squire data set (1995a); Sample 2: subset of countri- using gro~
household income surveys; Sample 3: subset of OECD countrim; Saml)le 4: LIS data set.
The first sample consists of the 69 countries for which I was able to compute the rate of
change, 39 The second one is perhaps the most reliable: it restricts attention to the 25 countries
for which the data are most comparable, having been obtained from similar types of surveys
(gross household income), The third one consists of the 19 OECD countries in the full sample.
It is complemented by the LIS data set, where I was able to perform the same regression on 16
muntries; the typical time interval is much shorter, however. The results are consistent across the
four columns: the negative and generally significant signs indicate mean–reversion in inequality.
To redua the chanm that these results were due to measurement error on the first observation
of adding to the Gini the average size of the bias, which Deininger and Squire compute to be about 6.6 Yo in their
data set.
3TGiven that there are onlY ~ven observations in eac]l c=, tbe differences in standard deviations ‘r coefficients
of variation documented in Table 3 are, unsurprisingly, not statistically significant. In my view this does not make
them any less intriguing, especially in the light of tbe other eviclence discussed below.
38For a log_normal, the Gini is a monotonic function of the variance of the 10gs A?. I also ran manY of ‘lle
regressions with the logarithms of the Ginis instead of the levels. This led to similar results.
39~tncting the sample to th- countri~ where at le~t ten years sel]arate the first and last oblsemations leads
to throwing out nine data points, with essentially unchanged rcsu]ts.
34(which bias- the wefficient towards negative values), I ran the regression with the exact same
right–hand–side variables but replacing the left–hand side by the average rate of change between
the s~ond and last available observations. For the first three subsamples the inefficient remained
virtually unchanged and startistically significant (t–stat istics ranged from 1,9 to 3,O). For the LIS
data set, it bmme positive and insignificant; however, that regression contained only 12 data
points (with the trend often mmputed over dates separated by just a few years) as opposed to
betw~n 18 and 62 for the Deininger and Squire data set.
One problem with this test is that inequality and its rate of change are computed over different
periods for different countries. The incompleteness of the data set does not permit one to run the
standard cross–sectional regression over a fixed, ten or twenty year period. To generate a usable
panel it is nassary to interpolate some missing data, This is what I did, using neighboring
observations when required to obtain Gini coefficients for 1970, 1980 and 1990. I was then able to
run inequality mnvergence regressions for the periods 1970–1 980 (Table 5a, 33 countries), 198&
1990 (Table 5b, 38 muntries) and 1970-1990 (Table 5c, 25 countries). The first mlurnn presents
the basic regression of the change in the Gini on the initial value and a constant. The coefficient
is negative and significant at the 5% level for 197&l 980, similar in size but significant only at
the 107o level for 1980-1990, and small and insignificant for 1970–1 990. One sourw of concern
is that the data from different muntries may not be directly comparable. Some numbers come
from expenditure surveys, others from income surveys; some pert ain to household income, others
to personal income; finally, most concern gross inmme, but some are for net (after tax) figures.40
I deal with this issue in three different ways, all of which lead to similar results. First, I include
in the regression dummy variables for observations generated from expenditure data, personal
inmme data and net inmme data (expdum, perdum and netdum); the results are reported in the
smnd mlumn of Table 5. Alternatively, I first regTess both the initial and final Gini coefficients
on these dummies (evaluated at the relevant years), then run the regression on the residuals
(“dginires”, third column of each table). Finally, I run the regression on the subset of countries
which used gross family income for both dates. These results, given in the “Sample 3“ column
of each table, are very similar to the previous ones. Once again there. is significant evidence of
inequality mnvergence from 1970 to 1980, much less so from 1980 to 1990 and none at all for the
whole period 1970 to 1990.
One problem which might explain the puzzling discrepancy between the first two results and
the last one is that the data for ewh subperiod are for different subsets of countries, I therefore
reran the regressions, with and without dummies, on yet another subsample consisting of the 24
muntries for which 1970, 1980 and 1990 observations were available (either from the original data
or by interpolation). The results are presented under the heading “Sample 2“. Once again the
estimates are all negative, with a drop in significant but not in magnitude from the first decade
to the semnd, and a drop in both when moving to the full twenty–years period. A possible
40Deininger and Squire (1995a) d~u= these problems, of wllicll tile first one is tile most serious.
35explanation would for some countries to go from above to below the mean (say) during the first
decade, then move back above during the second one, In the fourth, much smaller subsample of
OECD countries, by wntrast, the evidence of mean-reversion seems stronger in terms of both
magnitude and stability across periods. Overall, the regressions reported in Tables 5a to 5C
insistently point to some mean–reversion between 1970 and 1980, but the picture for the other
periods is much less clear. It is interesting to recall that in Table 3, the dispersion of inequality
across major regions of the world experienced most of its decline between the 1970’s and the
1980’s. koking across individual countries, however, one sees no evidenw of any narrowing in
the range of Ginis. The standard deviation (sdev), reported in the last two lines of Table 5, shows
no virtually no change during any of the two decades under considerate ion.
The general picture which emerges at the end of this empirical exercise is thus a mixed one:
general stability in the world distribution of Ginis, within which countries and regions seem to be
experiencing some non–negligible amount of relative mobility. The question of whether there is
actual convergence or whether countries oscillate around dist inet long–run levels of inequalit y still
awaits a definite answer. This is perhaps not surprising given the rather preliminary nature of
the analysis and, above all, the limitations of the data.41 My main purpose, however, was to put
forward the issue of convergence in distribution as an important and essentially unexplored topic
for empirical research. Hopefully, future studies with more sophisticated econometrics and better
data (looking across states or regions as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)) will help resolve the
issue.
Two related empirical questions also deserve serious investigation. One, motivated in par-
ticular by Proposition 9, is whether there is so to speak “convergence in redistribution”. Are
countries, or even industrialized countries, converging to the same relative size of the welfare state,
or are there permanent differences in the social contr~t? Evidence on OECD countries provided
by Lindert (1996) suggests the latter, but more formal tests on larger samples are needed.42
Another broad issue is whether educational, fiscal, or other forms of progressive redistribution
xtually increase mobility, a formalized in equation (27) and suggested by most models with
imperfect capital markets. Recent work by Cooper (1996) studying the effect of state financing
of education on the intergenerational mobility of families in poor communities suggests a positive
answer. Mulligan (1995), on the other hand, finds only mixed evidence that borrowing constraints
affect the transmission of inequality.
41In particular, I have only looked at unconditional convergence. The l]otential effects of develo]]ment on inequal-
ity (e.g., the Kuznets hypothesis) and the reverse links from inequality to growth studied in this pal)er sugg=t that
the dynamics of mean income and income inequality should be examined jointly.
‘*See Piketty (1995) and B6nabou (l995A) for models which seek to explain such persistent differences.
366 Conclusion
Non representativ~agent growth theory has developed so rapiclly in recent years that this tour
is necessarily incomplete. First, I focused only on the effects of income or wealth inequality on
growth, rather than the reverse. The first model’s income distribution evolved endogenously in
response to credit mnstraints and policy outmmes, but due to the homotheticity of preferences,
technology and policy it WM not affected by the economy’s level of development. I thus entirely
abstracted from the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, except when discussing the role of fixed rests.
This choim reflects both sp= constraints and a waning interest in the Kuznets curve, arising
from its lack of empirical support in most remnt studies, Similar homogeneity properties in the
s-rid model precluded me from examining whether sociopolitical conflict and extensive rent-
seeking are diseases more likely to afflict poor countries or rich ones (see Benhabib and Rustichini
(1996)). Another level-dependent effect of income distribution arises in the ‘(big push” theory
formalized by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). If industrialization requires a sufficiently large
domestic market to make increasing returns technologies profitable, excessive concentration of
wealth may represent an obstacle to growth. The relevant constraint, however, is the absolute
mnomic weight of the middle class, which in a large country like Inclia is considerable even with
very high inequality. Keefer and Knack (1995) test the “big push” mechanism by including in
growth regressions measures of market size such as population, total GDP, and openness to trade,
both by themselves and interacted with income distribution. They find no support for the theory
in their data. An empirically more successful direction of research concerns the links between
income distribution, fertility, and development. Perotti (1996) finds that a greater income share
of the middle CISSShas a strong negative effect on fertility, and this in turn has a significant
positive impact on growth. I did not discuss this mechanism due to space constraints and because
there is yet no well worked out theory of distribution, fertility and grcjwth which can robustly
generate these mrrelations, Among the models which have begin to formalize some of these
links, moreover, the kind of wealth constraints on educational investment which were extensively
mnsidered in Section 3 often play a critical role (e.g., Galor and Zang (1993)).
Even for the three main theories which were examined in some depth, the analysis necessarily
involved a number of simplifications. For ancision I abstracted from inheritecl ability, dynastic
altruism, occupational choice and effort decisions of workers, ent reprenellrs or rent–seekers, as well
as from spillovers and non~onvexi ties of any kind. All these elements have been incorporated in
the literature, and their role mentioned at various points in the paper.
Where do we go from here? The political economy and imperfect capital market models are
now well understood and have reached the quantitative stage. 43 While further developments
43See for instance Krusell, Quadrini and Rfos–Rfill (l W), (1995) in the first case, Fern andez ancl Rogerson
(1994) and B6nabou (1995b) in the WOnd. There also many quantitative models where liquidity constraints
impede consumption=rno othing but not invmtment (e. g., Ayagari (1994), Bertola (1995)), hut their ]]roperties are
rather different.
37(perhaps in relation to fertility or technolog) will surely prove valuable, the gap between the
swpe of the theoretical literature and the scarcity of direct evidence makes further empirical
work a high priority: signs of the adverse effects of redistribution on growth remain elusive (to
put it mildly), and inferences about the role of credit constraints far too indirect. With respect
to sociopolitiml conflict, there remains room for theoretical and empirical work to move closer
to one another. Existing models provide many valuable insights but few robust results about the
effects of income inequality on mfiict, whether mnflict will be open or latent (off the equilibrium
path), fully predictable or uncertain. On the empirical side, the vatiances of policy and property
rights variables should be included in the regressions, so as to determine whether it is instability
or just the average level of extra–legal redistribution that matters. Examining the interaction
between mnomic inequality and inequality of political power in determining the occurrence of
open ~tict also seems desirable.
Coming full circle, it is tempting to conclude by asking: which of the theories linking distri-
bution and growth considered in this paper best shed light on the experiences of South Korea
and the Philippines? While this is not a substitute for detailed csse studies (see for example
Rodrik (1995) on Korea and Taiwan), one would expect the most relevant mechanisms to clearly
show up in basic indicators such as those compiled by Barro and Wolf (1989). Once again, the
pure political economy hypothesis of excessive redistributive pressure emanating from the poor,
whether through the ballot box or the street, does not fare well. Public transfers in Korea were
low but still two-and-a half times higher than in the Philippines: 3.71% versus 1.46% of GDP
on average between 1970 and 1980. ~ucation expenditures show the same pattern, with shares
of 5,13% and 1.97% respectively. 44 While the Philippines’ government redistributed much less,
it mnsumed a little more: 1.66% of GDP, versus 1.58% in South Korea. These numbers are
broadly wnsistent with the creditwnstrained human capital accumulation hypothesis, and in-
deed Korea’s educational investment skyrocketed past that of the Philippines: the enrollment rate
in secondary education went from 42% in 1960 to 95% in 1985, as opposed to 50% to 65% for the
Philippines. Similarly, for tertiary education Korea’s 1965 enrollment rate of 6% was far behind
the Philippines’ 19Yo; by 1992 roles were reversed, with rates of 42% and 28% respectively. An-
other likely piece of the puzzle is the Philippines’ much higher fertility rate (5.55% versus 3.6070
between 1965 and 1985), although the extent to which it reflects economic as opposed to cultural
factors is unclear. Turning now to theories of social conflict and property rights, political instabil-
ity does not appear very relevant in this inst ante, as the two countries experienced similarly high
levels of turmoil. The Philippines had more revolutions and political assassinations, Korea more
riots, coups, government crises and constitutional changes. Their indices of political rights and
44Both the ~nmdotal evidence on the phi]i~Pinm and the fact that 40% of hea] th subsidies went to the richest
207. of the population (this number is cited by Alesina (1W5)) su~~t the tyl]e of l)ath analyzed in Proposition 9,
characterized by redistribution to the wealthy and low growth, or even Verdier and Ades’ (1 993) model of purely
renta=king elit=. Most of the Barro and Wolf (1989) data mentioned here are averages over 1-1985; the figures
given below for tertiary ducation are from the World Bank’s 1986 and 1995 World Development Reports.
38civil liberties were also virtually similar. 45 The more discriminating indicators of property rights
protection discussed earlier (rule of law, enforceability of contracts, expropriation risk, mrruption,
46 This general security of property rights was etc. ), on the other hand, put Korea distinctly ahead.
probably instrumental not only in creating a favorable climate for business investment, but also
in inducing Korean households to entrust much of their considerable savings to a stat~controlled
banking system, which in turn channeled credit towards the industries deemed strategic by the
government, without excessive dissipation along the way.
45Barro and Wolf’s (1989) data on the average number of th= events l)er year for Korea and the Phili])pines
are Sttie = (0.00, 0.00), Revel= (0.31, 0.46), Rwt = (2.12, 1.00), Assass= (0.12, 0.73), CoILp = (0.09, 0.00), Crisis
= (0.38,0.08), Constih = (0.22, 0.09), Polr-ight = (4.80, 4.7), CiVlib = (5.0, 4.5).
dGThe earliat available data are BERI’s (BusinH Environmental Risk Intelligence) 1972 scor= for bureaucratic
delays, enforceability of contracts and nationalization potential. On a scale of O (worst) to 4 (best), Korea scored
(2.1, 2.3, 2.6) and the Philippines (1 .5, 1.9, 2.2). This ]]attern is confirme(l by the additional data available for the
last ten years. The averages of these three BERI xores computed by Keefer and Knack (1995) over 198&l 995 were
2.2 and 1.7 respectively. The average ICRG (International Country Risk Guirle) scores over 1986–1995 were 36.7
and ~.3, on a scale of zero to 50. See Keefer and Knack (1995) for sourc= and definitions.
39Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us first study the properties of the function V(7) defined by (12). ~early, (13) implies
that it has a unique, global maximum at ~ = O. Moreover,
v“(T) 1 +pp(l – 72)
‘—= (1 -T)2(1 +pp(l -T))2 PP
(Al)
is positive if and only if 72 < 1 + l/p~. Thus V is strictly concave on the policy domain (z, 1),
where z - –~~. By (11), individual i’s utility function U;(7) is of the form V(~) + (1 +
p) ln(A + Bi~) and therefore also strictly concave on (z, 1). The envelope theorem then yields the
claims which follow equation (11 ), as well as Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
The result for taxation was proved in the text. Next, note from (9) that
For A small enough, ~2r/~A~A was seen to be negative, and the fact that dT/dA is proportional
to A makes the second term again dominated by the first; hence the result, Similar derivations
apply to intertemporal efficiency V.
Proof of Proposition 4
The first claim follows directly from (22). Differentiating this equation and using (6) also
impli- that .
(A.2)
Since the left side is increasing in ~, g increases with r up to some 79(A) E [z, 1), then decresses.
This maximum is interior (and increasing in A) if and only if
(1 -P)A2 > (1 -Z)2;1 +PP)’ (A,3)
As z < –1, it suffices for instance that (1 – @)A2 > 1/(4 + 8p~). The growth-maximizing tax
rate is positive if
1
(A.4) 79(A) >0~(1–~)A2 > ~+pP.
Proof of Proposition 5
Because W(7) is the sum of V(T) and a concave, quadratic function of 7, it is strictly concave
on (z, 1). The same statements hold for individual preferences ZJi(T), now given by (24). The
social and (interior) private optima are thus respective] y defined by W’(~) = O and ZJ’i(7) = O. In
the planner’s case, (23) implies that V’(~p) = –p@(l – D)(1 – 7P)A2. The fact that V is strictly
40mncave and maximized at zero then yields Claim 1, while Claim 2 follows from setting in w; = m
in the first-order condition U’i (~) = O derived from (25). Next, let ra be the preferred tax of
the agent with average wealth, in w = m + A2/2. Clearly, ~“ < Tp if and only if U’a(~p) <0,
which by (25) is equivalent to W’(rP) + [p~2(l – 7P) – p~/2]A2 <0, that is, to P(1 – 7P) < 1/2.
~tivalently, W’(I - (29)-1) >0, so by (23) and (13),
(1 - ~)A2 1 – (2p)-1 z 4~(2~ – 1)
7P >1 – (2p)-1 + 20
> (2p)-’(l +pp(2~)-’) *‘1 ‘P)* > 2+p ‘
hence CZaim 3. Finally, let us show that when ~ < 1/4 there exists an interval where the tax rate
Tm set by the median voter is less inefficient than that set by the average agent, ~a. As A goes to
zero the median mnverges to the mean, and both Tm and To converge to the planers’ optimum,
which is 7P(O) = O. Therefore, from (25): W’(~a)/p~ = (1/2 –Q(l –T”))A2 = (1/2 –@)A2 +O(A2)
and W’(rm)/p~ = –~(1 – 7~)A2 = –@A2 + 0(A2). Thus if ~ < 1/4 and A is small enough,
W’(~”) > –W’ (~m), which implies (using Taylor expansions) that Tp – r“ > rm – Tp and therefore
W(r”) < w(~m).
Proof of Proposition 6
Strictmncavityof individual preferences U’(7) implies that the equilibrium tax rate is uniquely
defined by the fist~rder rendition (26), or
as long as there is an interior solution ~“ (A, J) > Z. Since WA < 0 < —Vr it is clear that ~“ is
strictly increasing in A. Proposi tion 5 showed that maximizing W requires J w > O; conversely
Aw < A because for J > A, V(O, A, J) <0 so r“ is negative, implying W’(~*) >0 since 7P(A) >0.
The fact that growth is maximized at ~C > Aw is obvious; conversely, as ~ increases towards the
value which makes 7* (A, ~) equal to Z, T*(A, A) falls below ~g(A), implying g’ (~”) > 0. Therefore
~G is interior, as long as (A. 3) is satisfied. This concludes the proof of Claim 1, which concerns
the effects of A on equilibrium taxes r*(A, A).
I now turn to the effects of A on ~“, and the resulting contributions to W and g. The solution
to (A,5) is interior for all A if and only if maxA{(P@)-lV’(l) + (1 – Z)A2 – AA} >0, or
(A.6)
2< 4/(1 + 2pp)). which will be assumed from here on (since z < – 1, a sufficient condition is ~ _
~uations (A.5) and (25) then imply:
W’(T*)= p~A(A – P(1 – r*) A),
~T* 2A(1 –7*) – A
~A — = –vi/(7*)/p@ + A2 “
(A.7)
(A.8)
41Therefore, whenever rising inequality induces tax cuts, these are always inefficient:
87”
~ <0 + W’(T*) >0. (A.9)
For A < 0 equations (A.7) and (A.8) imply 8r*/8A > 0 and W’(7*) < 0, hence g’(~’) <0
a fortiori. This proves Claim 2. For A > 0, ~7*/~A > 0 if and only if ~“ S 1 – J/(2 A), or
equivalently W(l – A/(2A), A, A) <0. Substituting (13) into (A.5), this means
A/(2A) – 1
(~/2A)(l + pO~/2A) ‘%-’A<0eA>~(’::?;:4) =*m ‘AIO)
Note now that (A.6) implies that p~A2/4 < 1, hence ~ > 0. Therefore r“ is U-s/~aped with
respect to A : its declines from r’ (O, A) = O to a minimum 7“ <0 at ~, then rises again towards
r“(co, A) = 1, cutting the ~ = O axis at A = A. Finally, (A.5) shows that as A ~ +ml ~“ tends
to one with 1 – ~“ = O/A, where
–&+(l–~)A2– AA= O*–A/O+ AO– AA= O~O– l/0= A, (All)
which ha a unique solution O > 0 for each A. For further reference note also that this limit is
reached from below:
V(A, ~) E n:, (1 –T*(A, A))A<0. (A.12)
~t us now turn to the efficiency consequences of these variations in ~“. By (A.8), W’(~*) 20 if
and only if ~’ 21 – A/~A. Equivalently, W(l – A/(~A), A, A) 20, or:
Two cases are thus possible:
Case (i): if A2 > @2/(1 – ~) then W’(~*) > 0 for all A. Therefore on the interval [0, A]
where taxes decre=e with inequality, these reductions in ~“ are always inefficient. On [A, +aI)
taxes increases with inequality, although never sufficiently fast. Indeed, one can show that
limA+w[A(l – 7P(A))] = (1 – ~)-112, which is less than 6 defined in (All) if and only if
A2 > p2/(1 –p).
Cue (ii): if A2 < ~2/(1 – ~) then W’(r*) >0 on [0, A) and W’(T*) <0 on (A, +m), where
(A,13)
Observe now that ~ > A > A. This implies that W’(r*) >0 over the whole interval [0, A] where
T“ decreases with inequality, and even over a strict superset of the interval [0, A] where capital is
subsidized (~ < O). This is intuitive, as the planner always wants to set ~P(A) > 0. Only once
42inequality has reached A does it drive equilibrium taxes ~“ (A, A) > 0 to excessively high levels.
This mncludm the proof of Claim 3, u far as intertemporal efficiency is conmrned.
It only remains to mnsider the growth effects of ~r*/dA, that is, the sign of g’(~”). Using
(A.2) and (A.5) one can write, as long as ~“ # O,
(1 - r*)A2 - AA g’(~’) >0 e < (1 –@)A2 @ T*[A/A – (1 – ~“)(1 – (1 –P)r”)] >0. (A.14)
7“(1 – 7*)
Note first that in the neighborhood of A = 0+, where ~ R 0–, this condition is never sat isfiecl.
This is intuitive sinm the losses from heterogeneity are of s-rid order in A2, whereas the induced
tax effects on savings are of first order. Next, mnsider the condition in the neighborhood of A
defined by (A.1O), where T* = 1 – A/(2~) <0:
g’(T*(A, A)) > 0 e 2<1 – (1 –p)(l –A/(2A)) e ~ < 1 ‘A2’4 #
1 – ppA2/4
(A.15)
It is easily shown that the righ-hand side is smaller than that of (A.6) if and only if (1 –~) Izl >1,
or equivalently (1 —~)2 (1 + 1/p@) > 1. This inequality holds if and only if ~ is not too close to
one, in which case there exists a range of A’s satisfying (A.6) such that g’(~*(A, A)) >0. In this
parameter configuration, tax cuts induced by rising inequality just below A reduce growth, while
tax increases which occur as A rises just above A tend to improve it. To show that this last result
is not specific to the region regressive of tipi tal subsidies (~” < O), let us next examine g’ (7”) at
A = A. Sin~ 7“(A, A) = O, (A.2) shows that:
g’(7*(A, A)) >0 e A2> (1- B):l+PP)”
Again it can be shown that the right-hand side is greater than of (A.6) as long as ~ is below
some fied upper bound. In that case there exists a range of A’s such that increases in inequality
in the neighborhood of A = A+ generate tax increases to positive levels which still improve the
growth rate, Finally, let us mnsider (A. 14) as A ~ m and 1 – ~“ s O/A, The condition becomes
A ~ ~19,which by (Al 1) is equivalent to A2 2 ~2/(1 – ~). When this condition (which once more
is compatible with (A.6) if and only if ~ is s not too close to one) holds, g’(~*(A, A)) > 0 even
asymptotically: equilibrium taxes increase with inequality, but too slowly from the point of view
of maximizing not only W but even g. men A2 < ~2/ (1 – ~), on the other hand, taxes eventually
increwe too fast with rising inequality, whether from the point of view of welfare or from that of
growth,
43Proof of Proposition 7
CZaim 1 immediately results from Propositions 4 and 6, or directly from (A.7)-(A.8), For
A >0, let us write out:
(pPA)-’ ~ _ = -(1 -Q)(I -T”)’+
(~ -PA(1 -T*)) (2A(1 -~”) -A)
–V’’(7*)/p~ + A2 “
(A.16)
T—T’
The numerator of the second term is a qutiatic polynomial in A whose maximal value is [(2 –




> (2 - B)2 ~’
–v//(T*) 1 + pp(l – T“’)
4 + 4(1 –~) < p~A2 = A’(1 –7*)2(1 + p~(l ‘~*j~~7)
by (Al). Now, recall from (A. 12) that A(l – ~“) <0 for all (A, A, ~), so the right-hand side is
greater than 6-2 (1+ p~(l – Z) )-2. Provided ~ is below this value, dW/dA is therefore negative for
all (A, A). For ~ close to 1, on the other hand, it is clear that the second term in (A. 16) dominates,
By (A.7) and (A.8) this second term is positive if and only if b~*/~A >0 and W’(~*) >0, which
ouurs when A E (A, A), where these two bounds are defined by (A.1O) and (Al 3) (in which ~
can be set equal to 1). This mncludes the proof of Claim 2.
Consider now growth. First, we showed earlier that if ~2 < ~2/( 1– ~), g’ (~”) becomes negative
as A bemmes large enough. Since 8r*/aA > 0 for A > A and ~g/~A < 0 always, this proves
that dg/dA <0 for A large enough in this c~e, To obtain a result which is independent of ~ and
to make clear the role played by @ <1, let us use (A.2) and (A. 5) to compute:
(~A)-l ~ = -(1 -p)(l -T*)’ +
((1 -~)~’(1 - ~*)A - (1 - ~*)A +~)(2A(l - ~’) - A)
dA T=T* T*(-vII(T*)/pD + A2)
(A.18)
Focus now on values A > A, for which T* >0. The numerator of the second term is a quadratic
polynomial in ~ whose maximal value is (1 –7’)2(1 + (1 –~)~*)2A2/4. Therefore, (dg/dA),=T. <0
for A > A as long as:




As A tends to infinity, 1 – T’ H 13/A and –V’’(~*)/(p~A2) = 6-2, so the rendition bmmes
1 + 6-2> (1 – @/2)2/(1 – ~). This holds if and only if ~ is below some critical value in (O, 1),
hence the first part of Claim 3. Conversely, one can show from (A. 18) that lim~+O[(dg/dA)T=T. ] =
A2Q limA+o[–A/~*] >0. Indeed as A -0 (or also as ~ - 1) the growth rate (22) reduces to the
complete markets we, where ~g/ar <0.
44Proof of Proposition 8
The asymptotic variance A& = s2/(1 — ~2(1 — T)2) associated to a constant tax rate r
decreases on the domain (z, 1); note in particular that ~(1 – Z) < 1. Let T(A) denote the
inverse, decreasing function, which maps (s2, s2/(1 —@*(l —z)*)) into (z, 1). A steady–state is an
intersection of this decreasing curve with the equilibrium tax function ~“ (A, A) defined by (26) or
(A.5), When A <0 this function is upward-sloping, by Proposition 6; hence there can be at most
one equilibrium, Moreover, r*(s2, A) < r“(m, A) = 1 = T(s2) and ~*(s2/(1 – ~2), J) > ~*(0, A) =
O = T(s2/(1 – ~2)), so there is a unique steady–state, with ~~ E (O, 1). Finally, a decrease in A
shifts up the 7“ (A, A) function, which then cuts T(A) at a higher ~ and a lower A.
Proof of Proposition 9
By Proposition 6, the equilibrium tax function r“ (A, J) is now [1–shaped in A : it decreases
from ~*(0, J) = Oto a minimum at A = ~, then rises towards r’ (m, A) = 1, cutting the ~ = O axis
at A = A. The fact that r“ (A, A) now has a decreasing segment implies that it can intersect T(A)
at several points, Here I shall only cllaracten”ze the set of equilibria, rather than derive sufficient
conditions for multiplicity (this is done in B6nabou (1995a), for a closely related model). It is easy
to see that such multiple intersection can only happen in the range A < A where r“ (A, J) <0,
and that this smnario requires s2/(1 – ~2) < A. The number of intersections must then be odd, as
~*(s2/(1–~2), A) <0 = T(s2/(1–~2)) and T*(s2/(1–~2(1 –~)2), A) > ~ = T*(s2/(1–@2(l –z)2)).
Denote {(Aj, rj)}~=l these intersections, with Aj < Aj+l and O > Tj > ~j+l, and let W(~j, Aj,)
be the mrresponding levels of intertemporal efficiency. By Proposition 5, each W(-, Aj) is strictly
ancave and maximized at some 7P(A ~) > 0. Since W(7, Aj) is decreasing in its second argument,
this allows us to write:
W(Tj+I, Aj+I,) < ~(~j+l, Aj,) < ~(~j) Aj,), (A.19)
hence the result that intertemporal efficiency declines as one moves to a more regressive steady-
state. The same holds a fortiori for ex–ante welfare, since the insurance motive makes it increas-
ingly costly to reduce incomesharing from Tj to ~j+l as the variability of income rises from Aj
to Aj+l. A ranking similar to (A. 19) obtains for gowth rates as long as rj = ~“ (Aj, ~) <79 (Aj);
such is the case in particular if the Aj’s satisfy (A,4), ensuring that 79(Aj) >0. Since rj <0 for
all j, implying A; > s2/(1 – ~2), it suffices that S2 > (1 + @)/(l + pfl).
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